Re: Why is cryptoanarchy irreversible?
At 5:24 PM 11/7/1996, Timothy C. May wrote:
At 6:56 PM -0600 11/7/96, Andrew Loewenstern wrote:
middle men). Weak Crypto (i.e. GAK) does not offer these features because the weak point in the chain becomes a mostly disinterested low-wage employee at the KRC, which is likely to be operated by a foreign government! Any businessman can immediately understand why this is unacceptable, especially with all of the economic espionage stories going around corporate america.
And the GAK advocates have never clarified how an international system will work. Even if one accepts the dubious hypothesis that the U.S. has a noncorrupt, benign government, what of other countries? Is Ghaddaffi the keeper of keys in Libya? How about the military government of Burma?
I can imagine no scheme which could possibly solve this problem. None. The problem of "rogue governments" (and maybe all governments are rogue to at least some other governments) means no simple solution. And the Administration has done nothing to clarify how this will all work.
I cannot speak for the GAK advocates. However, you could establish a system where messages between two countries are encoded with keys which are made available to only the two countries in question. A really simple scheme to do this would be for each country to publish a public key. You would be required to encrypt the key to the message with the national public key. That scheme would be fast to deploy. In a more complicated and secure scheme, you would be given a public key from each country that was unique for your communications at the same time you were granted your international communications license. The unique public key would be managed by a small group of people. This means that if it was ever compromised, most message traffic would be secure and those who were responsible would be easy to find. The only way you are at the mercy of the Libyans is if you do business in Libya. Peter Hendrickson ph@netcom.com
At 7:20 PM -0800 11/7/96, Peter Hendrickson wrote: ...
I cannot speak for the GAK advocates. However, you could establish a system where messages between two countries are encoded with keys which are made available to only the two countries in question.
A really simple scheme to do this would be for each country to publish a public key. You would be required to encrypt the key to the message with the national public key. That scheme would be fast to deploy.
Well, this is not what the proposals for GAK involve. If it were _only_ a matter of each country requiring GAK for communicatons entering its country, then this would be as you describe (not that many of us would approve of it). What complicates matters is that the U.S. proposes that _it_ keep records/escrows of communications with, say, recipients in Libya. Or Russia, or Burma, or Tazbekinoya. This means automatically that simplistic models ("encrypt to the public key of Tazbekinoya" will not be sufficient).
In a more complicated and secure scheme, you would be given a public key from each country that was unique for your communications at the same time you were granted your international communications license. The unique public key would be managed by a small group of people. This means that if it was ever compromised, most message traffic would be secure and those who were responsible would be easy to find.
The only way you are at the mercy of the Libyans is if you do business in Libya.
No, I think you are missing the point. The issue about Libya is that the GAK system must make decisions about when and under what conditions it accedes to government wishes--for governments we may be hostile toward. Or governments may be hostile toward us. As I said in another message, I don't think there can be a unified GAK policy. I believe the U.S. Administration hopes to browbeat enough nations into compliance such that it--the U.S. government--controls which keys are released and which are not. My point about "rogue" governments is that the problems of Burma, Libya, etc. will not vanish. Clearly the U.S. government will not settle for waiting for Libya or Burma to co-release keys.... And nothing in GAK says one gets to communicate with Libyan parties by encrypting with the public key of Libya, thus bypassing the U.S. decryption capabilities! --Tim May "The government announcement is disastrous," said Jim Bidzos,.."We warned IBM that the National Security Agency would try to twist their technology." [NYT, 1996-10-02] We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, I know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay@got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^1,257,787-1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."
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Timothy C. May