re: NIST GAK export meeting, sv

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Tim May 12/5/95 6:25 PM:
This last bit is really rich. I can't think of a single publically defensible reason for the stipulation that every escrow agent must employ someone with SECRET clearance, <<etc.>>
One "defensible" (and maybe even good) reason is because someone with government clearance can then be prosecuted for leaking what they know, whereas ordinary citizens are harder to prosecute for this. I doubt this is the main reason, but it makes a certain kind of sense.
Nice point, though I too doubt that's the reason: if *every* agent needed to be cleared, then this clearance stipulation would serve nicely, but if only *one* at every escrow agency needs to be cleared...
But there are other more interesting links between Secret clearances and wiretaps.
The "Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court" meets in Arlington, VA as the need arises to authorize wiretaps in private, <interesting but etc.>
Of course, just because escrow agents would be required to hire *someone* with a SECRET clearance doesn't mean that *anyone* with a SECRET clearance would fill the bill. <etc.>
Many think tanks and defense contractors have "sheep-dipped" retired intelligence officials working for them and continuing to report (in various ways) to their former paymasters.
Sometimes these sheep-dipped agents are just there to keep tabs on what's going on, sometimes they're there to nudge these companies in certain directions, and sometimes they are actually running "deniable" applications from the private sector. (Recall Hughes, Air America, Castle Bank, etc.)
I can imagine that if some companies talked about in connection with certain questionable activities (Banker's Trust, Bank of America, Wackenhut, SAIC, etc.) were to bid for the contract to be a GAK Agent, then there would be contacts back to the intelligence agencies.
Organizations like SAIC seem like "naturals" for GAK escrow agents -- and they're a forgone conclusion as far as spookery is concerned. What troubles me is the suggestion that *every* agent *must* hire someone who might answer to a higher authority, as it were. And what troubles me more is watching this paragovernment's transparent efforts to reproduce itself step by step, always trying to elude efforts to make it accountable or subordinate to civil authorities.
But most GAK accesses would be handled through normal channels, albeit secret.
Of course. But most cops and prosecutors haven't developed the "national security" verbal tic. Yet. GAK stinks, but this security-clearance stipulation *really* stinks. Of course, I'm preaching to the choir... Hieronymous -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQBVAwUBMMUMXL3g0mNE55u1AQHR0wIAj/86ga/1T0FJ7gZt5ZVwlCLt4pq2g0Nt QpoDWlul6q9ub51k3wwA6Kn1np3NMoYpjLS/bdPew0XUBMJpQs/l/Q== =AdMm -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Anonymous writes:
What troubles me is the suggestion that *every* agent *must* hire someone who might answer to a higher authority, as it were. And what troubles me more is watching this paragovernment's transparent efforts to reproduce itself step by step, always trying to elude efforts to make it accountable or subordinate to civil authorities.
Whoa. Time-out. Having a SECRET clearance does not imply that one is answerable to the government. You don't get a clearance independent of a job. You have to be hired for the job, then the investigators look for anything that might disqualify you, then you get the clearance. A key-escrow company could hire anyone they want. Assuming that they're approved for a SECRET billet when they're approved as an escrow agent, the *company* designates the individual the government is to investigate. The only leverage the government really has is the right to take the clearance away. The person (and probably the company) could sue for its return if it was really done as a pressure tactic. The guidelines for approving or denying such clearances are pretty specific.
participants (2)
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nobody@REPLAY.COM
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Scott Brickner