Re: Remailer Attack
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Anonymous sez: : According to Raph's remailer stats, the remailers have widely varying : latencies. Given that only a few remailers have latencies which are : acceptably low, the list of usable remailers is quite low. : If the user of the remailer, Monty Cantsin for example, signs his : messages, a fairly accurate measure of total transit time is obtained. : The total transit time gives clues to the remailers which were : actually used in the chain. In an of itself, this may not comprise : the user, but combined with other weaknesses it will cause the : attacker to be significantly more confident of identification : hypotheses. : The remailers should all have about the same latency. 0 seconds seems : like a good Schelling point. What would it take to reduce remailer : latency to under 60 seconds for most of the remailers? Do people need : old 486s to dedicate to the task? Do they need money? Better : software? Most remailers support a feature called 'latency', so one can choose the latency one desires for a message. ie: :: Anon-To: username@host-name-here.nl Latency: +00:00 This message will be remailed imediately, no queing etc. -- Alex de Joode | usura@SABOTAGE.ORG | http://www.sabotage.org Sabotage Internet: Your Internet Problem Provider.
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Alex de Joode