Cash, cheaters, and anonymity
Here's a long response. But it's my only post of today, as the list was going on and on about atom bombs, uranium sabots, and alpha particles, and with debate about why some of us are ignoring these posts and the posts of ranters and baiters. This topic is more in line with my reasons for being on this list. Sorry for the length. Hal Finney writes:
One question is the ease of theft in a digital cash environment, and the consequences of claiming that secrets have been stolen. This problem was recognized very early on in discussions of digital signatures. The whole point of a signature is so that someone can be held to a commitment. But an easy "out" would be to "accidentally on purpose" let the secret keys be stolen, then to claim that the signature was actually forged. Contrariwise, a business might be vicitimized by actually having its secrets stolen and a forged signature created that committed it to an unfavorable action.
Hal is right the problem of *repudiation* or *disavowal* was recognized early on. Alice is confronted with a digital signature, or whatever. She says; "But I didn't sign that" or "Oh, that's my old key--it's obsolete" or "My sysadmin must have snooped through my files," or "I guess those key escrow guys are at it again." APPROACHES TO REPUDIATION **The purist approach: you *are* your key. If another biological unit obtains your key, he or she is effectively you. Guard your key carefully. **The modern American "excuse" approach: Hey, if you want to disavow a contract, like, just claim your key was stolen or, like, you lost it. I understand the reasoning behind adopting a more intermediate stance, but I think that only the purist stance will hold water in the long run.(A hint of this: untraceable cash means, for most transactions of interest with digital cash, that once the crypto stuff has been handled, whether the sig was stolen or not is moot, because the money is gone...no court can rule that the sig was invalid and then retrieve the cash!) [It is true that Chaum went to great lengths to develop system which preserve anonymity for single-spending instances, but which break anonymity and thus reveal identity for double-spending instances. I'm not sure what market forces caused him to think about this as being so important, but it creates many headaches. Besides being clumsy, it require physical ID, it invokes a legal system to try to collect from "double spenders," and it admits the extremely serious breach of privacy by enabling stings. For example, Alice pays Bob a unit of money, then quickly Alice spends that money before Bob can...Bob is then revealed as a "double spender," and his identity revealed to whomver wanted it...Alice, IRS, Gestapo, etc. A very broken idea. Acceptable mainly for small transactions. More on this later.] NEGOTIATED PROTOCOLS TO REDUCE RISKS However, just as most folks make arrangements with their bank/ATM machines (semantic meaning #2 of "ATM") to limit cash withdrawals to, say, $200 a day (it varies), so too can digital cash arrangements make similar contractual deals to limit losses. Some possible plans: * Plan A: The protocol insists on retinal scan or other biometric authentication between the "smartcard" used as the cryptographic keying device and the putative owner. The "Thunderball" plan. (issues: preserving anonymity with biometric authentication, spoofing of the channel between card and physical apparatus, theft of smartcard, etc.) * Plan B: The protocol only allows, say, $1000 per transaction. And no more than 3 transactions per day. Each transaction that is cleared sends a demon message to the account owner through a separate communications channel. (This sounds complex...the idea is to provide a signal that an account is being accessed, allowing the account owner to put a hold on the account. Even if he can't stop the transactions underway, or recently completed, because of the lags that may exist in this feedback, he can limit losses. Kind of a mix between off-line and on-line transactions....such mixes are to be expected, with the choice up to parties, depending on costs, risks, speed of communications, etc.) * Plan C: Use off-line cash only for "small" transactions, such as those now handled with physical coins and small bills. Use on-line clearing for larger amounts, with various forms of biometric security. This echoes how things are done today: off-line cash is what you can carry, in bill, coin specie, etc. Larger amounts (hundreds of dollars and up) is almost always handled on-line, via either credit cards (on-line clearing, albeit not anonymous/untraceable) or checks, cashier's checks, etc. (Coins and cash bills are really "on-line clearing" though, in that their existential properties make them acceptable immediately; they are not replicable, at least not easily, and hence can be conserved in transations. All the usual stuff about the nature of cash money.) Which will be used? (and there are many variants...) As usual, markets will allow choice. Many people will choose to limit exposure with Plan B-type transactions. Others will contract with insurance agents who cover risks by insisting on their own protocols for added security. (I don't mean conventional insurance agents, naturally.) MISCELLANEOUS STUFF
On the other hand, I would hope that people actually can learn to use care in safeguarding their secrets. The pass words and PINs we use today may be complemented by physical checks for voice patterns, thumb prints, perhaps (ironically) handwriting. Another approach would be
Most smartcards in use today support some form of local PIN entering, some way to provide a truly memorizable extra piece of identiy. Other biometric measures remain a hot area of research. Stroke recognition, thumbprints, etc. In about 5 years, when I think digital cash will be ready for prime time (pun intended), these additional mechanisms should be deployable, for a price. (Market-driven again: those who want to pay less in insurance will take better steps. Companies may adopt standards. Banks may enforce them.) ...
suggestions (one here a couple of days ago) to use various kinds of information exchange between the authenticating device and the human user in order to prove authorization in such a way that even a thief who has snooped on past exchanges will not be able to use the device. This approach is sometimes called the use of "pass algorithms".
"Zero knowledge interactive proof systems" have been used for password systems; no amount of past snooping or eavesdropping helps. (Of course, the user still has to have physical security over his local computer, or PDA, dongle, or secret decoder ring.) This seems like a readily-solvable problem (and one we already accept with existing ATM machines). THE INCREDIBLE IMPORTANCE AND ELEGANCE OF ON-LINE CLEARING ...
Applying this to the double-spending case, I suspect that Bob Hettinga is more on the right track in seeing the solution in the legal system rather than a simple "shucks, you caught me" forfeiting of a bond worth triple damages. There really should be no excuse for double
*On-line clearing* for larger amounts is, in my opinion, the Right Thing. Networks are getting deployed widely and are speedy. ATM, SONET, ISDN, and all the rest. I want to elaborate on this, even though I think most of Hal's points are made with off-line clearing in mind. I want to make the case for why on-line clearing is the One True Digital Cash. Conceptually, the guiding principle idea is simple: he who gets to the train locker where the cash is stored *first* gets the cash. There can never be "double spending," only people who get to the locker and find no cash inside. Chaumian blinding allows the "train locker" (e.g., Credit Suisse) to give the money to the entity making the claim without knowing how the number correlates to previous numbers they "sold" to other entities. Anonymity is preserved, absolutely. (Ignoring for this discussion issues of cameras watching the cash pickup, if it ever actually gets picked up.) Once the "handshaking" of on-line clearing is accepted, based on the "first to the money gets it" principle, then networks of such clearinghouses can thrive, as each is confident about clearing. (There are some important things needed to provide what I'll dub "closure" to the circuit. People need to ping the system, depositing and withdrawing, to establish both confidence and cover. A lot like remailer networks. In fact, very much like them.) In on-line clearing, only a number is needed to make a transfer. Conceptually, that is. Just a number. It is up to the holder of the number to protect it carefully, which is as it should be (for reasons of locality, for self-responsibility, and because any other option introduces repudiation, disavowall, and the "Twinkies made me do it" sorts of nonsense). Once the number is transferred and reblinded, the old number no longer has a claim on the money stored at Credit Suisse, for example. That money is now out of the train locker and into a new one. (People always ask, "But where is the money, really?" I see digital cash as *claims* on accounts in existing money-holding places, typically banks. There are all kinds of "claims"--Eric Hughes has regaled us with tales of his explorations of the world of commericial paper. My use of the term "claim" here is of the "You present the right number, you get access" kind. Like the combination to a safe. The train locker idea makes this clearer, and gets around the confusion about "digimarks" of "e$" actually _being_ any kind of money it and of itself.) Off-line systems may be useful for paying for movies, toll roads, etc., but there the protocols can be set up to limit exposure to fraud. (Ontological constraints, such as number of movie theater attendees, etc., will limit the losses. Scams will likely still exist, but the problem seems manageable with some work.) And as networks get much faster, expect even off-line cash to fade. Depends on costs, insurance rates, benefits, and of course on regulations.
spending, even of a penny, and the penalties could be made strong enough to deter most people. If a bank does not think they will be able to find and prosecute a person who is withdrawing off-line digital cash, they will probably not give any to him. Then if the
The "first to the locker" approach causes the bank not to particularly care about this, just as a Swiss bank will allow access to a numbered account (or used to...please let's not have a dozen posts arguing about this, as is so often the case on this list!) by presentation of the number, and perhaps a key. Identity proof *may* be needed, depending on the "protocol" they and the customer established, but it need not be. And the last thing the bank is worried about is being able to "find and prosecute" anyone, as there is no way they can be liable for a double spending incident. The beauties of local clearing! (Which is what gold coins do, and paper money if we really think we can pass it on to others.) IS PROOF OF PHYSICAL IDENTITY NEEDED? ...
money is double-spent, the person who withdrew it would be prima facie responsible, with a reasonable presumption that they did it unless there is significant evidence otherwise. I don't know that this is how it will work out but it is one possibility (unless the uncertainty just scares everybody away - but I think the digital signature experience will get people used to the concepts and problems).
I recall some analyses of these situations a while back. I looked in my "Crypto" Proceedings but didn't find it. The danger of making the "person who withdrew it" a culprit if the money has already been "spent" is clear: he is just as likely to be an innocent victim of a setup as the guilty party. With off-line clearing, and not the "handshaked" beauty of immediate clearing, one has to rely on "trust"--tough with an anonymous person. On-line clearing has the possible danger implicit in all trades that Alice will hand over the money, Bob will verify that it has cleared into his account (in older terms, Bob would await word that his Swiss bank account has just been credited), and then Bob will fail to complete his end of the bargain. If the transaction is truly anonymous, over computer lines, then of course Bob just hangs up his modem and the connection is broken. This situation is as old as time, and has always involved protcols in which trust, repeat business, etc., are factors. Or escrow agents. REAL ESCROW AND TRUE NYMS Long before the "key escrow" of Clipper, true escrow was planned. Escrow as in escrow agents. Or bonding agents. Alice and Bob want to conduct a transaction. Neither trusts the other; indeed, they are unknown to each other. In steps "Esther's Escrow Service." She is _also utraceable_, but has established a digitally-signed presence and a good reputation for fairness. Her business is in being an escrow agent, like a bonding agency, not in "burning" either party. (The math of this is interesting: as long as the profits to be gained from any small set of transactions is less than her "reputation capital," it is in her interest to forego the profits from burning and be honest. It is also possible to arrange that Esther cannot profit from burning either Alice or Bob or both of them, e.g., by suitably encrypting the escrowed stuff.) Alice can put her part of the transaction into escrow with Esther, Bob can do the same, and then Esther can release the items to the parties when conditions are met, when both parties agree, when adjudication of some sort occurs, etc. (There a dozen issues here, of course, about how disputes are settled, about how parties satisfy themselves that Esther has the items she says she has, etc.) UNTRACEABLE MARKETS FOR ASSASSINATIONS To make this brutally concrete, here's how escrow makes murder contracts much safer than they are today to negotiate. Instead of one party being caught in an FBI sting, as is so often the case when amateurs try to arrange hits, they can use an escrow service to insulate themselves from: 1. From being traced, because the exchanges are handled via pseudonyms 2. From the killer taking the money and then not performing the hit, because the escrow agent holds the money until the murder is verified (according to some prototocol, such a newspaper report...again, an area for more work, thankfully). 3. From being arrested when the money is picked up, as this is all done via digital cash. There are some ways to reduce the popularity of this Murder, Incorporated system. (Things I've been thinking about for about 6 years, and which we discussed on the list and on the Extropians list. I'll save this for another time.) My point here is to show how on-line clearing works in conjunction with an escrow agent function.(Esther clears the cash, and can issue new cash to Bob, who "trusts" her that if he does the job, the cash will clear, as she's the escrow agent he's dealt with many times before.) THE DANGER OF EVER USING PHYSICAL IDENITY VERIFICATION
The other point I wanted to discuss was this issue of the bank authenticating the people who receive the cash. This does raise the spectre of a big brother system where there is some way to identify people with 100% certainty. Obviously this could be abused.
Danger! Danger! Danger! Any such system, that relies on physical IDs is substantially less private that banks today in many countries, and is not at all what I would call "digital cash." On-line clearing makes this unnecessary.
Without the authentication, you're not going to have off-line cash, IMO. You will be stuck with on-line systems in which everyone has to verify everything before accepting it. This means you pay a cost in communications overhead and possibly other foregone opportunities.
Agreed. But acceptable with a two-tiered system: - off-line cash for small transactions, with smartcards, "observer" protocols, and with built-in limits - on-line , immediately-cleared cash for larger transactions, also with various agreed-upon limits or requirements RISKS Is there a danger that people will lose the numbers that they need to redeem money? That someone could steal the number and thus steal their money? Sure. There's the danger that I'll lose my bearer bonds, or forget my Swiss bank account number, or lose my treasure map to where I buried my money (as Alan Turing supposedly did in WW II). People can take steps to limit risk. More secure computers. Dongles worn around their necks. Protocols that involve biometric authentication to their local computer or key storage PDA, etc. Limits on withdrawals per day, etc. People can store key numbers with people they trust, perhaps encrypted with other keys, can leave them with their lawyers, etc. All sorts of arrangements can be made. Where I'm not sure I agree with what Hal is saying is that _personal identification_ is but one of these arrangements. Often used, but not essential to the underlyng protocol. Again, the Swiss banks (maybe now the Liechtenstein anstalts are a better example) don't require physical ID for all accounts. (More generally, if Charles wants to create a bank in which deposits are made and then given out to the first person who sings the right tune, why should we care? This extreme example is useful in pointing out that _contractual arrangements_ need not involve governmental or societal norms about what constitutes proof of identity.) PAPIEREN, BITTE Hal goes on to talk about blinded credentials. A very important idea in our permission slip-happy society, and an idea that is not getting nearly enough attention. (Chaum's seminal "Transaction Systems to Make Big Brother Obsolete," from Oct or Nov of 1985, in "Communications of the ACM," remains required reading here.) But I also take a more radical view. Ask yourself why credentials are _ever_ needed. Maybe for driving a car, and the like, but in those cases anonymity is not needed, as the person is in the car, etc. Credentials for drinking age? Why? Let the parents enforce this, as the argument goes about watching sex and violence on t.v. (If one accepts the logic of requiring bars to enforce children's behavior, then one is on a slippery slope toward requiring television set makers to check smartcards of viewers, or of requiring a license to access the Internet, etc.) In almost no cases do I see the need to carry "papers" with me. Maybe a driver's license, like I said. In other areas, why? This gets to a core issue: the incredible benefits of locally clearing a transaction. Caveat emptor, buyer beware, etc. Cash on the barrelhead. In transactions where "future performance" is needed, as in a contract to have a house built, or to do some similar job, then of course the idea of on-line or immediate clearing is bogus...like paying a stranger a sum of money on his promise that he'll be back the next day to start building you a house. Parties to such long-term, non-locally-cleared cases may contract with an escrow agent, as I described above. This is like the "privately-produced law" we've discussed so many times. The essence: voluntary arrangements. Maybe proofs of identity will be needed, or asked for, maybe not. But these are not the essence of the deal. An interesting area. I apologize if this essay, while long, is not quite long enough to capture the ideas I wanted to express. To me, these are core ideas. Maybe not as core to those of you who favor talking about depleted uranium sabots (but what about Chobham armor and explosive armor?) or about "PGP rulz, d00d!," but core isseus to me. Your smileage may vary. --Tim May .......................................................................... Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay@netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^859433 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."
tcmay@localhost.netcom.com (Timothy C. May) writes:
**The purist approach: you *are* your key. If another biological unit obtains your key, he or she is effectively you. Guard your key carefully.
**The modern American "excuse" approach: Hey, if you want to disavow a contract, like, just claim your key was stolen or, like, you lost it.
I understand the reasoning behind adopting a more intermediate stance, but I think that only the purist stance will hold water in the long run.(A hint of this: untraceable cash means, for most transactions of interest with digital cash, that once the crypto stuff has been handled, whether the sig was stolen or not is moot, because the money is gone...no court can rule that the sig was invalid and then retrieve the cash!)
I would love the purist stance, except that it is untenable. Every security system is breakable, if enough effort, money, and professionalism are involved. We should never kid ourselves about this. One time pads are provably secure, but someone can still break in and physically steal your plaintext, or steal you and bring out the rubber hoses... If crypto does become widespread, then it will be used in situations where the value of the key justifies considerable effort and expense to steal it, and it will happen. There must always be a mechanism to deal with repudiation. As to your later point about mootness, I would not be comfortable saying that there are limits to what a court will attempt to coerce cooperation.
* Plan A: The protocol insists on retinal scan or other biometric authentication between the "smartcard" used as the cryptographic keying
This is just a second private key, and no more immune to forgery or theft by a professional.
**The purist approach: you *are* your key. If another biological unit obtains your key, he or she is effectively you. Guard your key carefully.
I would love the purist stance, except that it is untenable. Every security system is breakable, if enough effort, money, and professionalism are involved.
So the purist stance is untenable? Less than 2 years ago I was a homeless person, living on the banks of the San Lorenzo River. Then I met a person named "Timothy C. May." He wasn't interested in being on the Net anymore--he said it took too much of his time--so he game me his account, his password (which I've since changed, of course), and said "Have fun." The purist stance is much more common than many might think.
We should never kid ourselves about this. One time pads are provably secure, but someone can still break in and physically steal your plaintext, or steal you and bring out the rubber hoses... If crypto does become widespread, then it will be used in situations where the value of the key justifies considerable effort and expense to steal it, and it will happen. There must always be a mechanism to deal with repudiation.
There are plenty of items of property that can be stolen, and are stolen. And yet these items continue to exist, be sold, traded, etc. If someone is really, really worried about havin their codes stolen, they can arrange to use codes only usable in their banker's office (not altogether a bad idea, by the way), or with a duress code built-in, etc. Or none at all. Choice, and costs. In any case, the free markets will have a major effect. With strong crypto, the communications transparently cross borders, making legal moves problematic. --Tim May -- .......................................................................... Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay@netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^859433 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."
tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May) writes:
So the purist stance is untenable? Less than 2 years ago I was a homeless person, living on the banks of the San Lorenzo River. Then I met a person named "Timothy C. May." He wasn't interested in being on the Net anymore--he said it took too much of his time--so he game me his account, his password (which I've since changed, of course), and said "Have fun."
The purist stance is much more common than many might think.
I don't think this is really the purist stance. You defined it as 'you are your key', and my view is that revocation will have to be possible. All that your argument above is saying is 'email address and claimed name are insufficient to prove identity' -- surely no one disputes that?
There are plenty of items of property that can be stolen, and are stolen. And yet these items continue to exist, be sold, traded, etc.
Yes. And physical possession of them is not generally considered to be unquestionable legal proof that you are the person who originally owned them.
If someone is really, really worried about havin their codes stolen, they can arrange to use codes only usable in their banker's office (not altogether a bad idea, by the way), or with a duress code built-in, etc. Or none at all. Choice, and costs.
In all honesty, I don't see physical key theft to be a major problem for individuals, since it can generally be made unprofitable. Where I see legal key revocation as essential, is for corporate situations. That is where a multi million dollar cost of stealing a key could still be quite profitable. We need to figure a way to extend web of trust to revocations and corporate identity.
In any case, the free markets will have a major effect. With strong crypto, the communications transparently cross borders, making legal moves problematic.
Unfortunately, I think that the courts will expand too. The courts may not be able to freeze and confiscate your foreign assets, but they may be able to block you from doing a great deal of business without very frequent changes of 'name' and reestablishment of reputation. Also, there is always the possibility of being hampered in the physical world. We all have to buy groceries, and the physical means of communication will always be vulnerable to pressure. This is not to say that I don't think crypto will weaken government. It will. Making court rulings effective will be far more expensive than it currently is.
Timothy C. May writes
Alice pays Bob a unit of money, then quickly Alice spends that money before Bob can...Bob is then revealed as a "double spender," and his identity revealed to whomver wanted it...Alice, IRS, Gestapo, etc. A very broken idea.
Correctly implemented, with offline cash that grows in each transaction until cleared online, this should reveal Alice's identity, not Bob's If we fear double spending we insist on the spender presenting an expensive identity, an identity that would be tedious or costly to replace. The larger the amount, the stronger our concerns of identity. But the identity is known only to the parties to the transaction. (Who may be different tentacles of the same biological person.) The tentacle trick is what makes the existing identity based checks on Bermudan and Hong Kong banks effectively anonymous. If we do not like the identity, we ask for online clearance.
I want to elaborate on this, even though I think most of Hal's points are made with off-line clearing in mind. I want to make the case for why on-line clearing is the One True Digital Cash.
Quite so. And with a smooth interface between the truly anonymous online cash and the controlled nomity offline cash - an interface sufficiently smooth that the spender rarely notices which his software is using, we can have the best of both worlds. It is all in the software interface, something notoriously lacking from existing implementations.
Off-line systems may be useful for paying for movies, toll roads, etc., but there the protocols can be set up to limit exposure to fraud. (Ontological constraints, such as number of movie theater attendees, etc., will limit the losses. Scams will likely still exist, but the problem seems manageable with some work.)
Exactly so. Like the use of slugs in vending machines.
IS PROOF OF PHYSICAL IDENTITY NEEDED?
No, but for offline cash proof of an identity that would be expensive or tedious to replace is needed.
This situation is as old as time, and has always involved protcols in which trust, repeat business, etc., are factors. Or escrow agents.
Exactly so. We need varied kinds of digicash, for varied situations, and a smooth interface between them.
REAL ESCROW AND TRUE NYMS
Long before the "key escrow" of Clipper, true escrow was planned. Escrow as in escrow agents. Or bonding agents.
Alice and Bob want to conduct a transaction. Neither trusts the other; indeed, they are unknown to each other. In steps "Esther's Escrow Service." She is _also untraceable_, but has established a digitally-signed presence and a good reputation for fairness.
Exactly so:
I apologize if this essay, while long, is not quite long enough to capture the ideas I wanted to express. To me, these are core ideas.
Keep going, you mentioned, rather than explained, the problem of local and extended clearing. It seems to me, that rather than the one true protocol, we need a collection of standardized protocol tools and anybody and his dog can issue his own protocol for his own purpose, and the other guys computer can understand it and can give its master a list of options of what how the deal can go sour and who to finger if the deal goes sour in a particular way -- tell its master who the the master is trusting to pay and when. -- --------------------------------------------------------------------- We have the right to defend ourselves and our property, because of the kind of animals that we James A. Donald are. True law derives from this right, not from the arbitrary power of the omnipotent state. jamesd@netcom.com
I don't have time to write much now, but lots of good points have been made. I'll just toss out the other main idea for handling offline cash, which is Chaum's "Observer". The Observer is a tamper-proof device that sits inside (or plugs into) your computer, smart card, or PDA, and makes sure that you don't double spend. In fact, it is impossible to double spend because the Observer has to participate in every transaction. Yet Chaum has designed the protocols such that the Observer learns nothing about who you are or where you are spending. The technical requirements of the Observer in Brands' scheme are that it store 146 bytes plus 18 bytes per coin, and be able to do the discrete log signature, which basically requires 512-bit multi-precision arithmetic. And it has to be tamper-proof. At one time I was skeptical about that but we see with Clipper that the NSA appears to be confident that data can be protected in tamper-proof modules. With Observers you can have off-line cash that is as secure as on-line but without the costs of on-line validation. As a vendor, which would you rather accept: off-line cash where you rely on legal sanctions to track down cheaters; on-line cash where you call the bank and verify it for every transaction; or off-line cash where you can validate it right there locally without checking with any bank? Depending on the costs which the Observer adds to the digital wallet, that latter choice might be the most attractive. Hal
Tim has made a lot of good points, and I'll only try to respond to a few:
NEGOTIATED PROTOCOLS TO REDUCE RISKS
However, just as most folks make arrangements with their bank/ATM machines (semantic meaning #2 of "ATM") to limit cash withdrawals to, say, $200 a day (it varies), so too can digital cash arrangements make similar contractual deals to limit losses. Some possible plans:
* Plan A: The protocol insists on retinal scan or other biometric authentication between the "smartcard" used as the cryptographic keying device and the putative owner. The "Thunderball" plan. (issues: preserving anonymity with biometric authentication, spoofing of the channel between card and physical apparatus, theft of smartcard, etc.)
In Demolition Man, Wesley Snipes plucks the eyeball out of the victim to hold it up to the retinal scanner and escape. Hacked-off thumbs may provide similar workarounds for fingerprint protection. Maybe what we want is a system where some pass code is an alternative to physical ID. Giving up a secret pass phrase is a superior alternative to giving up your life, and worth it for a few hundred dollars. (I'll point out that this doesn't work if duress codes are widely used which give away the bad guys.)
[...] (Coins and cash bills are really "on-line clearing" though, in that their existential properties make them acceptable immediately; they are not replicable, at least not easily, and hence can be conserved in transations. All the usual stuff about the nature of cash money.)
I think this is where the tamper-proof wallet idea comes from; it is the closest anyone has come to providing truly conserved digital cash. With such a system you can get the benefits of on-line clearing even in the off- line environment, just as people will accept cash today without taking it to the bank first.
Which will be used? (and there are many variants...) As usual, markets will allow choice. Many people will choose to limit exposure with Plan B-type transactions. Others will contract with insurance agents who cover risks by insisting on their own protocols for added security. (I don't mean conventional insurance agents, naturally.)
I think this is the key point. All of our speculation about the relative advantages of the various forms of cash is largely irrelevant, as long as some form of privacy-protecting payments comes into existance. Then the details of the implementations will determine the relative costs and the market advantages of each approach. The hard part will be getting that first cash system in place. Oops, I've got to go. I'll just make a quick couple of points.
[...] ([...] My use of the term "claim" here is of the "You present the right number, you get access" kind. Like the combination to a safe. The train locker idea makes this clearer, and gets around the confusion about "digimarks" of "e$" actually _being_ any kind of money it and of itself.)
Dollar bills got their start this way. At one time they were just "claims" on the real dollars in the bank vaults. Yet most people find it more con- venient to think of them as money, even back when you could still turn them in for gold. I think it's useful to think of ecash as being money as well, although granted it is money with its own characteristics different in some ways from banknotes, checks, or coins.
Off-line systems may be useful for paying for movies, toll roads, etc., but there the protocols can be set up to limit exposure to fraud. (Ontological constraints, such as number of movie theater attendees, etc., will limit the losses. Scams will likely still exist, but the problem seems manageable with some work.)
One thing I think is clear is that off-line cash will not be issued to anonymous recipients. Imagine a magic quarter which would reappear in your pocket after you put it into the coke machine. How many people would be willing to resist using it? That's what you'll have with an off-line coin issued to a pseudonym.
And as networks get much faster, expect even off-line cash to fade. Depends on costs, insurance rates, benefits, and of course on regulations.
This is probably right, although ironically the infrastructure for off-line cash might be simpler. On-line cash needs 24-hour availability, quick (nearly instantaneous) response, a fully automated cash validation system. We have this now, with the Visa cards, but it didn't appear overnight. And I doubt that the Internet is a suitable communications medium for it (due to reasons of availability, reliability, and security). Off-line cash could be handled with longer turnaraounds in a machine which is not on the net, using manual intervention so pass words and such are not stored on-line. Of course the disadvantage is that the off-line cash requires identity authorization during issuing. Tim's ideas about escrow agents and a credential-less society are very interesting as well and I'll try to make some comments on them later. Hal
participants (5)
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Hal -
jamesd@netcom.com -
Linn Stanton -
tcmay@localhost.netcom.com -
tcmay@netcom.com