doj_escrow_intercept.procedures (fwd)
Wow! That procedure, if it could be verified to be followed, is almost good enough to satisfy my queasy feeling that some *very dificult* and *very publicly* accessable means of opening a back door might just not be appropriate. Even though this goes strongly against my personal interest I can envision situations where I would want them to have that ability. Imagine that it is your city that gets a terrorist nuke built in one of its basements. Truly secure and easy communication makes that a whole lot easier but then since a truly secure box is real simple to make, it sort of obviates the reasoning for trying to do the standardization anyway. Anybody who really wants absolute security will be able to get it at some price that won't be too high. :-) I would like to propose us the challenge to come up with a way utilizing this crypto technology and signatures and such to guarantee a verifiable trail whenever it is done that is available to any court of law. The implication is clear that other forms will be outlawed if this package is sold. No point in even doing it otherwise. So in case they win this one I suggest that, as Tom Lehrer talks about on his album Revisited, we "Be Prepared." :-) Peace, Bob -- Bob Cain rcain@netcom.com 408-354-8021 "I used to be different. But now I'm the same." --------------PGP 1.0 or 2.0 public key available on request.------------------
Robert Cain writes:
Wow! That procedure...
I'm having great difficulty extracting meaning from your prose, but I think you're saying that you like that the government has escrowed keys to Clipper phones for use in "national emergencies".
Imagine that it is your city that gets a terrorist nuke built in one of its basements.
We don't have many basements in Austin.
Truly secure and easy communication makes that a whole lot easier
Makes *what* a whole lot easier, building the bomb or catching the bombers?
but then since a truly secure box is real simple to make,
Really?
it sort of obviates the reasoning for trying to do the standardization anyway.
Obviates the reasoning? I'm confused.
Anybody who really wants absolute security will be able to get it at some price that won't be too high. :-)
So what exactly are you talking about? Sounds like you're happy the government introduced Clipper because it's so easy for anyone to build secure cryptographic devices. I'm having trouble understanding this.
I would like to propose us the challenge to come up with a way utilizing this crypto technology and signatures and such to guarantee a verifiable trail whenever it is done that is available to any court of law.
Whenever *what* is done? Whenever somebody builds a nuclear bomb?
The implication is clear ... I suggest that, as Tom Lehrer talks about on his album Revisited, we "Be Prepared." :-)
I think we should start with, "Be Lucid." -- | GOOD TIME FOR MOVIE - GOING ||| Mike McNally <m5@tivoli.com> | | TAKE TWA TO CAIRO. ||| Tivoli Systems, Austin, TX: | | (actual fortune cookie) ||| "Like A Little Bit of Semi-Heaven" |
Mike McNally sez:
Robert Cain writes:
Wow! That procedure...
I'm having great difficulty extracting meaning from your prose, but I
Hmmm, others have been having that problem lately. :-)
think you're saying that you like that the government has escrowed keys to Clipper phones for use in "national emergencies".
Yes, after long consideration that, that as I said runs counter to my self interest, I had to come to the conclusion first that is was in fact desirable to have a means to tap. It should be very difficult though and verifiable.
Imagine that it is your city that gets a terrorist nuke built in one of its basements.
We don't have many basements in Austin.
:-)
Truly secure and easy communication makes that a whole lot easier
Makes *what* a whole lot easier, building the bomb or catching the bombers?
It makes it easier for any clandestine plan to be established and carried out. This is the greatest fear they have. Arbitrary networks of people with arbitrary purposes can be securely formed world wide within the limits of the trust inherent in the people. Can you spell r e v o l u t i o n? It's not me that's paranoid, it's them. :-)
but then since a truly secure box is real simple to make,
Really?
Yep. It would take me about three months of full time effort and would be almost a single chip. I am not the only one by any means.
it sort of obviates the reasoning for trying to do the standardization anyway.
Obviates the reasoning? I'm confused.
Well, if it is as easy as I contend to make devices that are truly secure all the people that they would want to be able to monitor would undoubtedly have one.
Anybody who really wants absolute security will be able to get it at some price that won't be too high. :-)
So what exactly are you talking about? Sounds like you're happy the government introduced Clipper because it's so easy for anyone to build secure cryptographic devices. I'm having trouble understanding this.
No, I think now that Clipper is ultimately stupid. I do think that if it were *not* possible to easily get around it (black market probably, remember the "blue boxes" of yore :-) and not possible probably to even detect the illegal device's use (just use it as a front end to a Clipper :-), then an escrow system which was benign (I realize some think that an oxymoron) would be a good idea.
I would like to propose us the challenge to come up with a way utilizing this crypto technology and signatures and such to guarantee a verifiable trail whenever it is done that is available to any court of law.
Whenever *what* is done? Whenever somebody builds a nuclear bomb?
Whenever they use whatever process they may set up to allow back door entry. I'm wondering if something analogous to a paper trail could be guaranteed using our technology. I don't know if that is possible but have an inkling that it is.
The implication is clear ... I suggest that, as Tom Lehrer talks about on his album Revisited, we "Be Prepared." :-)
I think we should start with, "Be Lucid."
Or learn to write better. I'm workin' on it. :-) Peace, Bob -- Bob Cain rcain@netcom.com 408-354-8021 "I used to be different. But now I'm the same." --------------PGP 1.0 or 2.0 public key available on request.------------------
Makes *what* a whole lot easier, building the bomb or catching the bombers?
It makes it easier for any clandestine plan to be established and carried out. This is the greatest fear they have. Arbitrary networks of people with arbitrary purposes can be securely formed world wide within the limits of the trust inherent in the people. Can you spell r e v o l u t i o n? It's not me that's paranoid, it's them. :-)
While stopping terrorists may be easier in a country with pre-taped communications, and organizing otherwise undetected insurrection will be a little closer to possible, this is not the main purpose of wiretaps today or in the future. The real targets of wiretaps (now and in the future) are political activists. Anyone who poses a serious threat to large corporate profits is a target for a wire tap. This includes organizations like Greanpeace, the communist party, CISPES, and even libertarians who oppose superfluous military intervention. Sure, blowing up the world trade center costs money, but cutting arms sales to Indonesia just because of some little genocide on an island with only a few hundred thousand inhabitants... That cuts into profits; especially if it catches on. In the past, if Dow wants to put a tap on my friend's mom's phone (a prominent anti-pesticide activist), they can just hire a private investigator to climb the poll and sift through the conversations. No, they never found out who was taping the line, for some reason they didn't think to ask the guy who came around once a week to change the tapes on top of the pole (go figure). In the world where Clipper is predominant, the government will have a monopoly on this sort of activity. Two things are clear to follow: First, there will be fewer PIs able to do wiretaps. People chasing after abducted children or forgoten alimony cheques will be out of luck. Second, the government will be pressured into taking on the activities that are now done by PIs (at a substantially greater cost of course). This will force some relaxing of the rules governing obtaining escrowed keys. Since anyone purchasing the key escrow devices will have implicitly agreed to (amongst other things) wave any expectation of privacy associated with using the device, they probably wont have to much legal ground to stand on when they discover the their phone conversations have been sold to Exon. brad
participants (4)
-
Brad Huntting -
m5＠vail.tivoli.com -
Mike Godwin -
rcain＠netcom.com