Re: Enforcing the CDA improperly may pervert Internet architecture
One issue with the "We could require that everybody label their packets" proposal is that a large part of the world isn't under FCC or even US control; why should some foreigner label their packets based on the tastes of US censors? Another problem is that adequate labelling requires public-key cryptography, and the US bans export of crypto; this means you can't use the best technical standards for domestic use and export, and means you can't mass-market exportable rating software. We EEEVILLL Net Users would certainly be _happy_ if the FCC or Congress talked the Administration into legalizing the use of decent authentication technology. (They could argue that the ITAR permits authentication-only technology, but there are clear technical advantages to RSA vs. DSS, and DSS has the subliminal-key options that mean you can use it for non-authentication encryption as well as signatures anyway. There's also the problem that both are patented, though the patents behind DSS are weak and run out in a year or two.) Another problem is that this proposal would require multiple authentication headers per IP packet - not only is it wasteful, but is it even supported? I suppose there's some tunneling approach possible, but it'd be really awkward and non-portable. ObExon: Does the Administration propose to label any on-line copies of the Federal Register? There's often material in there, such as the recent Congressional debates on partial-birth abortion, that are clearly in violation of the CDA if posted to the nets, so they would have to be labeled. # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, stewarts@ix.netcom.com, +1-415-442-2215
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Bill Stewart