Re: Foiling Traffic Analysis
Date: Tue, 02 Jan 1996 19:44:53 -0800 From: shamrock@netcom.com (Lucky Green) Subject: Re: Foiling Traffic Analysis
At 20:02 1/2/96, Jon Lasser wrote:
When the group of packets arrives at a given station, it replaces its current encrypted packet with a new packet;
All participants in this network are clearly guilty of conspiracy. Their assets will be confiscated under RICO.
Sounds like disasterizing to me. This is merely a technical means for producing anonymous communications. Anonymity = conspiracy? - Carl +--------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | Carl M. Ellison cme@acm.org http://www.clark.net/pub/cme | | PGP: E0414C79B5AF36750217BC1A57386478 & 61E2DE7FCB9D7984E9C8048BA63221A2 | | ``Officer, officer, arrest that man! He's whistling a dirty song.'' | +---------------------------------------------- Jean Ellison (aka Mother) -+
You seem to be missing an important point about foiling traffic analysis. It is essentially the same problem as the covert channel problem and its solution has the same challenges - it consumes a great in the way of resources. In order to eliminate traffic analysis, you essentially have to always use the full bandwidth available (although you can have pseudo-random burst behaviors). This in turn means that instead of gaining the low cost resulting from sharing bandwidth, you end up having far more utilization and (depending on what portion of the world does this) increasing the price of the resource. So it costs a lot more and uses a great deal of bandwidth. -> See: Info-Sec Heaven at URL http://all.net/ Management Analytics - 216-686-0090 - PO Box 1480, Hudson, OH 44236
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