Anonymous wrote:

There are lots of good reasons to use remailers, but thinking that you are not responsible for your actions is not one of them. Anything you send may be around to haunt you for many years to come.

If you believe that any computer sytem is foolproof... you have a lot to learn. There is always a possibility that people will found out your real identity and where you live, through a human error or a flaw in the remailer. (Right, toto?).

Right, small, warm-blooded creature. There are a plethora of available avenues for surruptitious agents to exploit InterNet technology and methodology in order to reveal both your identity and the content of your communications. To truly achieve anonymity and privacy, one should be prepared to use the strictest standards of paranoia, the full capabilities of privacy and anonymity tools, and personal methodologies aimed at thwarting unlikely and/or impossible surveillance techniques as well as the currently known methods. Beyond the mere technology itself, one must consider the possibile use of psychological manipulation of individuals and groups into a specific mindset that, combined with an analysis of the individual's natural psychological profile, can enable a surreptitious entity to move the individual toward patterns or processes which will make the technological tools of identity and information analysis more effective. For example, take the fictitious case wherein an individual is prone to using only two different remailers, say, for instance, the remailer at c2net and the remailer at dhp.com. Suppose that the remailer at c2net was being monitored surreptitiously by an agent who had access to their system, but either had no way to access messages encrypted to the remailer, or their efforts to monitor the remailer seemed to be thwarted at times by another, unknown entity with access to the system. The surreptitious agent could arrange to have the c2net remailer shut down under some pretext, and seed the monitored individual's private email, mailing lists, and newsgroups with subtle pointers/suggestions as to the reliability/security, etc., of another remailer which was more securely under the agent's control, say, for instance, a remailer at replay.com. After the monitored individual has begun using the remailer at replay.com, then the agent would proceed to do the same thing in regard to the remailer at dhp.com, and another remailer controlled by the agent or associates of the agent, say, for instance the remailer at cypherpunks.ca. The agent is now in a postion to have the majority of the monitored individual's communications vulnerable to identity, information and traffic analysis, and thus will have an enormous amount of information to work with should the individual occasionally spread their anonymous communications through remailers that the agent may have less complete access to. If we suppose that the agent also is able to manipulate the monitored individual into sending the agent email that is encrypted to several recipients, including the agent or the agent's associates, then we see that the agent now has an even broader database of known information which can be analyzed to provide clues as to the identity of and the information sent by others who communicate with the individual who is being monitored. This fictitious example, if it came to pass, would serve to provide information to the agent which could be used to more effeciently target those who would be subjected to more restricted forms of surveillance, such as monitoring of the physical signals given off by their computer, keyboard, and monitor. All in all, the small, warm-blooded creature is correct in implying that one should always keep a shotgun by their computer, in the firm knowledge that the dogs of war do not always bark to announce their omnipresence.

Greets to all my friends in domestic surveilance.

And greets to all of my friends who are watching your friends. Anonymous ReMonger