Re: House National Security committee guts SAFE, worse than nobill
At 2:17 PM -0700 9/9/97, Declan McCullagh wrote:
This version of SAFE, in fact, is //much worse// for crypto freedom than having no bill passed at all.
True. <...>
It's time for advocates of crypto-freedom to turn obstructionist and oppose all legislation dealing with encryption.
And expect to accomplish what? To stick our heads in the sand now would just make it easier for the FBI to roll right over us. We still need to fight the expected FBI key recovey amendment when the Intelligence Committee and Commerce Committee vote this week, and then onto the floor (perhaps next year). Not to mention the Senate. This battle is FAR from over. It would be a serous mistake to give up now. Best, Jonah PS: Interestingly, Reuters is reporting that the Administraon has "serious problems" with the Dellums/Weldon Amendment: Clinton official not backing new encryption plan WASHINGTON, Sept 9 (Reuter) - The Clinton administration has serious problems with a new congressional proposal to tighten export limits on computer encoding technology even though it prefers the approach to one contained in earlier legislation, a top official said on Tuesday. Under Secretary of Commerce William Reinsch told Reuters that an amendment approved by the House National Security Committee earlier on Tuesday would give the secretary of defense veto power over encryption export decisions. "Giving the secretary of defense a veto is inconsistent with the president's executive order and inconsistent with the policies of four prior administrations," Reinsch said. "The administration thinks all relevent agencies should have a seat at the table and none should have a veto." Under current policy, enacted by presidential order last year, encryption export requests are reviewed by the Departments of State, Defense, Energy, Commerce and Justice, along with the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. The most powerful encryption products cannot be exported unless they contain a feature allowing the government to decode any messages covertly. The amendment, authored by Rep. Curt Weldon, Republican of Pennsylvania, and Rep. Ron Dellums, Democrat of California, would require the president to set "the maximum level of encryption strength that could be exported from the United States ... without harm to the national security of the United States." Products at or below the established level could be exported after a one-time review specified by the secretary of commerce with the concurrence of the secretary of defense. The proposal virtually gutted the bill to which it was attached. The original bill, written by Virginia Republican Rep. Bob Goodlatte, would greatly relax export controls. Reinsch said the administration supported the "harm to the national security" standard. "It gives the administration the authority it needs," he said. "We'd much rather have this than (the original)." Software companies, civil libertarians and Internet user groups all favor relaxing the current limits and expressed strong concerns about the Weldon amendment. The amendment appeared to outlaw differential treatment currently accorded to some encryption products used by financial institutions or subsidiaries of U.S. companies. Reinsch said that section of the amendment "could be more artfully drafted." He also criticized the proposal for not requiring companies to export products with features allowing for government access to coded messages, an approach known as key recovery. The current policy "links all of the parts together and uses export controls as a device to move towards key recovery," he said. "We believe export controls should include key recovery." --Aaron Pressman((202-898-8312)) Tuesday, 9 September 1997 18:02:46 RTRS [nN0972124] * Value Your Privacy? The Government Doesn't. Say 'No' to Key Escrow! * Adopt Your Legislator - http://www.crypto.com/adopt -- Jonah Seiger, Communications Director (v) +1.202.637.9800 Center for Democracy and Technology pager: +1.202.859.2151 <jseiger@cdt.org> http://www.cdt.org PGP Key via finger http://www.cdt.org/homes/jseiger/
At 5:31 PM -0700 9/9/97, Declan McCullagh wrote:
"Giving the secretary of defense a veto is inconsistent with the president's executive order and inconsistent with the policies of four prior administrations," Reinsch said. "The administration thinks all relevent agencies should have a seat at the table and none should have a veto."
In other words, all the relevant agencies together should have a veto. Hardly a surprise. Reinsch is merely quibbling over details. (In fact, the amendment wouldn't even give Defense a solo veto.)
I am not suggesting that we should relax because the Administration is not completely satisfied with this provision. They scored a hit against SAFE, just like we won one at the Foreign Relations Committee. Border skirmishes in the larger, ongoing war. None the less, this is much bigger than a quibble over details, IMHO. There are important policy implications of this language. And politically, it is extremely significant that Reinsch would be critical at all, considering that the Committee voted to substantially undercut the bill (one of Reinsch's top priorities). Perhaps you missed this nuance. Best, Jonah * Value Your Privacy? The Government Doesn't. Say 'No' to Key Escrow! * Adopt Your Legislator - http://www.crypto.com/adopt -- Jonah Seiger, Communications Director (v) +1.202.637.9800 Center for Democracy and Technology pager: +1.202.859.2151 <jseiger@cdt.org> http://www.cdt.org PGP Key via finger http://www.cdt.org/homes/jseiger/
At 7:52 PM -0700 9/9/97, Declan McCullagh wrote:
On Tue, 9 Sep 1997, Jonah Seiger wrote:
I am not suggesting that we should relax because the Administration is not completely satisfied with this provision. They scored a hit against SAFE, just like we won one at the Foreign Relations Committee. Border skirmishes in the larger, ongoing war.
The war in Congress is essentially over. There is no realistic hope of good crypto legislation passing. I'd be interested to hear any hypothetical that you'd suggest to the contrary. Keep in mind when concocting it that you'd have to get past the Senate -- where pro-crypto legislation has been dead for months -- and a presidential veto.
I agree that things look pretty bleak and that the chances for passing good crypto legislation are not so good at the moment. And, for the record, CDT strenuously opposes the amended SAFE bill, S. 909, and the various proposals coming from the FBI. We also do not see a way to reconcile these proposals, and are not working for a "deal" (sorry Seth). We plan on opposing these bills by vigorously engaging in the process -- being there at every turn to tell the Congress and the Administration why they are wrong, why key recovery won't work, and why export relief is necessary to promote privacy and security on the Net in a way that is constructive and moves the issue forward. Lets step back for a moment and look at the bigger picture. We all agree that the status quo is not good for privacy. The Bernstein case was important in proving our rhetorical points (and good for Bernstein), but it didn't topple the current export policy, which we all know is crippling the widespread availability of strong, easy-to-use crypto. The Administration WANTS legislation to impose key recovery and wants continued export restrictions. It has passed the Senate Commerce Committee, it's in the current export policy, and the FBI is likely to get it approved by the Intelligence committee tomorrow. If they succeed and mandatory key recovery becomes law, there will certainly be court challenges (and CDT would join that fight), but it won't be as clear cut as the CDA case was, and it's doubtful we would have the strength (and the resources) of as broad a coalition of plaintiffs. We may be right, but that doesn't guarantee victory. Eventually, if we want to achieve anything, we will need to change the current policy. We do not believe that can be accomplished by simply by being 'obstructionists'. We do believe that it can be accomplished by engaging in the process, letting Congress and the Administration know that we care about this issue, and are willing to fight for what we believe. We are not ready to give up just because we took a hit in the National Security Committee. Hope that helps clarify. Jonah * Value Your Privacy? The Government Doesn't. Say 'No' to Key Escrow! * Adopt Your Legislator - http://www.crypto.com/adopt -- Jonah Seiger, Communications Director (v) +1.202.637.9800 Center for Democracy and Technology pager +1.202.859.2151 <jseiger@cdt.org> PGP Key via finger http://www.cdt.org http://www.cdt.org/homes/jseiger
On Tue, 9 Sep 1997, Jonah Seiger wrote:
I am not suggesting that we should relax because the Administration is not completely satisfied with this provision. They scored a hit against SAFE, just like we won one at the Foreign Relations Committee. Border skirmishes in the larger, ongoing war.
The war in Congress is essentially over. There is no realistic hope of good crypto legislation passing. I'd be interested to hear any hypothetical that you'd suggest to the contrary. Keep in mind when concocting it that you'd have to get past the Senate -- where pro-crypto legislation has been dead for months -- and a presidential veto. Can you honestly say that any legislation that would survive such a fearsome test would be better than the situation we have now? (That is, no domestic controls, an export control regime hanging from a shoestring, and moderately successful court challenges.)
None the less, this is much bigger than a quibble over details, IMHO. There are important policy implications of this language. And politically, it is extremely significant that Reinsch would be critical at all, considering that the Committee voted to substantially undercut the bill (one of Reinsch's top priorities). Perhaps you missed this nuance.
The "important policy implication" of this language may just be Freeh serving as a convenient launching platform for trial balloons. Reinsch can swat them down as he sees fit if they get hit by too severe a barrage, then reintroduce them later after the clamor dies down. (Politically, BTW, it is much more interesting what Gore said today than Reinsch.) Like I said, bad cop and worse cop. Reinsch was critical of nuances -- ones that you perhaps missed -- not the general plan to wire in Big Brother. Keep in mind this is not just law enforcement talking. This is policy that comes from the top. Remember Clinton's executive order last fall. Or before that, his predecessor. Classified documents reveal George Bush in December 1991 approved a policy to ban strong crypto and allow only snooperware (crypto with a backdoor). Then in early 1992 the White House OMB moved to suppress related documents critical of mandatory wiretappability and privacy. Again, this comes from the highest levels of the administration. Tell me again how you'll get past that veto. -Declan
At 11:06 PM 9/9/97 -0700, you wrote:
On Tue, 9 Sep 1997, Declan McCullagh wrote:
[Jonah Seiger writes]:
There are important policy implications of this language. And
politically,
it is extremely significant that Reinsch would be critical at all, considering that the Committee voted to substantially undercut the bill (one of Reinsch's top priorities). Perhaps you missed this nuance.
[Declan takes over]:
The "important policy implication" of this language may just be Freeh serving as a convenient launching platform for trial balloons. Reinsch can swat them down as he sees fit if they get hit by too severe a barrage, then reintroduce them later after the clamor dies down. (Politically, BTW, it is much more interesting what Gore said today than Reinsch.) Like I said, bad cop and worse cop. Reinsch was critical of nuances -- ones that you perhaps missed -- not the general plan to wire in Big Brother.
Gore didn't say shit. Sorry but there is no polite way to say this. Gore's remarks at the SPA speech were a great example of "state speak" which the State Dept. has perfected, saying much and in "code" through the use of phrasing and even tone.
Gore said the White House couldn't support Freeh's plan... what he meant was "yet" because, in fact, thereis no formal plan to "accept."
What the (nameless) SPA keynote speaker said (on stage and off to the sides after his presentation) was much more interesting. The words "old dogs, new tricks" and some private discussion I share with him convince me that the administration is violently split. Understand that in the Washington world his comments betray a extremely heated debate behind the scenes. Bottomline, the United States is probably going to get the administation bill next year and we will have to take strong crypto there underground. (This is because there is no compromise. Either the government can break it at will, or it can't). Unfortunate, but clearly the most probable outcome.
But the minute that the House or Senate pass such a proposal out of committee is the minute WhH policy changes. And I'll be anyone one that... any takers?
Gore is playing word games, practing for the run for the money in 2000.
The only glimmer of hope is the little whisperings that I heard over the week which say the anti-crypto language put in by intelligence will be yanked out all over again in (Judiciary?).
Don't count on the language being yanked in Judiciary. The real "only hope" is actually an incredibly low tech and unsexy thing called "time." The 105th Congress wants to split early, possibly in three weeks! Yes, three weeks (hard working lot, eh?) There is no way this bill gets through the Rules committee with multiple versons floating around and then gets brought to the floor for a vote... won't happen. So that sets up next year.... As for teh "violent split" in the White House, sure there is, but the split is *very deep* as in, deep in the Org chart. The starting players, save one, are all on board with the FBI plan. The one courageous main player is a Clinton loyalist until he dies, but Gore can't stand him. Our main man has the ability to pick up the phone--at any time-- and get Clinton on teh other end. He whispers intoBill's ear, but Bill is a lame duck and is setting up Gore for the "long run" in 2000. Nobody wants to look soft on crime, esp. in the ramp up to 2000. The White House will back this mandatory language, I'll bet on it (really, I'll bet on it, any takers?) the only "game" left here is to figure out how Gore will try and save face by supporting a recanting of his 'no mandatory crypto" stance. --Brock
At 9:12 PM -0700 9/12/97, Brock N. Meeks wrote:
As for teh "violent split" in the White House, sure there is, but the split is *very deep* as in, deep in the Org chart. The starting players, save one, are all on board with the FBI plan. The one courageous main player is a Clinton loyalist until he dies, but Gore can't stand him.
Our main man has the ability to pick up the phone--at any time-- and get Clinton on teh other end. He whispers intoBill's ear, but Bill is a lame duck and is setting up Gore for the "long run" in 2000.
So just who is "our main man"? Who are "the starting players"? Why the coyness? Why tease us with vague mentions of who the main players are, who the guy who can get Clinton on the phone is, etc.? Either they are or not (main men, that is). Either you know who they are or you don't. Don't keep us in suspense. --Tim May There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws. Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!" ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay@got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^1398269 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."
At 09:12 PM 9/12/97 -0700, Brock N. Meeks wrote:
Don't count on the language being yanked in Judiciary. The real "only hope" is actually an incredibly low tech and unsexy thing called "time."
The 105th Congress wants to split early, possibly in three weeks! Yes, three weeks (hard working lot, eh?) There is no way this bill gets through the Rules committee with multiple versons floating around and then gets brought to the floor for a vote... won't happen.
Are you sure about this? Traditionally, anti-civil liberties legislations is passed by well over 90% of the vote only days before Congress adjourns. --Lucky Green <shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred. DES is dead! Please join in breaking RC5-56. http://rc5.distributed.net/
OR... They are passed by voice vote of "unanimous consent" as was done with the 'brady bill' when only 5 senators were present. amp ------------------------ From: Lucky Green <shamrock@netcom.com> Subject: Re: House National Security committee guts SAFE, worse than no bill Date: Fri, 12 Sep 1997 21:55:42 -0700 To: "Brock N. Meeks" <brock@well.com> Cc: cypherpunks@toad.com, cryptography@c2.net
At 09:12 PM 9/12/97 -0700, Brock N. Meeks wrote:
Don't count on the language being yanked in Judiciary. The real "only hope" is actually an incredibly low tech and unsexy thing called "time."
The 105th Congress wants to split early, possibly in three weeks! Yes, three weeks (hard working lot, eh?) There is no way this bill gets through the Rules committee with multiple versons floating around and then gets brought to the floor for a vote... won't happen.
Are you sure about this? Traditionally, anti-civil liberties legislations is passed by well over 90% of the vote only days before Congress adjourns.
--Lucky Green <shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred. DES is dead! Please join in breaking RC5-56. http://rc5.distributed.net/
---------------End of Original Message----------------- ------------------------ Name: amp E-mail: amp@pobox.com Date: 09/15/97 Time: 19:42:59 Visit me at http://www.pobox.com/~amp == -export-a-crypto-system-sig -RSA-3-lines-PERL #!/bin/perl -sp0777i<X+d*lMLa^*lN%0]dsXx++lMlN/dsM0<j]dsj $/=unpack('H*',$_);$_=`echo 16dio\U$k"SK$/SM$n\EsN0p[lN*1 lK[d2%Sa2/d0$^Ixp"|dc`;s/\W//g;$_=pack('H*',/((..)*)$/) == 'Drug Trafficking Offense' is the root passphrase to the Constitution. Have you seen http://www.public-action.com/SkyWriter/WacoMuseum ------------------------
I left out a "not" here: At 8:42 PM -0700 9/9/97, Tim May wrote:
The "software as free speech, which means it can be subjected to prior
"cannot be subjected to"
restraint, government censorship, or export control" argument is proceeding nicely, thanks to Bernstein, Gilmore, Junger, Cohn, and others, and is a much more solid basis for ensuring civil liberties.
There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws. Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!" ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay@got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^1398269 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."
On Tue, 9 Sep 1997, Declan McCullagh wrote: [Jonah Seiger writes]:
There are important policy implications of this language. And politically, it is extremely significant that Reinsch would be critical at all, considering that the Committee voted to substantially undercut the bill (one of Reinsch's top priorities). Perhaps you missed this nuance.
[Declan takes over]:
The "important policy implication" of this language may just be Freeh serving as a convenient launching platform for trial balloons. Reinsch can swat them down as he sees fit if they get hit by too severe a barrage, then reintroduce them later after the clamor dies down. (Politically, BTW, it is much more interesting what Gore said today than Reinsch.) Like I said, bad cop and worse cop. Reinsch was critical of nuances -- ones that you perhaps missed -- not the general plan to wire in Big Brother.
Gore didn't say shit. Sorry but there is no polite way to say this. Gore's remarks at the SPA speech were a great example of "state speak" which the State Dept. has perfected, saying much and in "code" through the use of phrasing and even tone. Gore said the White House couldn't support Freeh's plan... what he meant was "yet" because, in fact, thereis no formal plan to "accept." But the minute that the House or Senate pass such a proposal out of committee is the minute WhH policy changes. And I'll be anyone one that... any takers? Gore is playing word games, practing for the run for the money in 2000.
On Tue, 9 Sep 1997, Brock N. Meeks wrote:
Gore didn't say shit. Sorry but there is no polite way to say this. Gore's remarks at the SPA speech were a great example of "state speak" which the State Dept. has perfected, saying much and in "code" through the use of phrasing and even tone.
WASHINGTON, Sept 9 (Reuter) - With the FBI floating a proposal to regulate the domestic use of computer encoding technology, Vice President Al Gore asserted Tuesday the administration had not changed its policy
Let's look at what Gore did say: that
allows free use within the United States. "The administration's decision has not changed on encryption, but this is an area where we need to find ways to work together to balance the legitimate needs of law enforcement with the needs of the marketplace," Gore told a meeting of the Software Publishers Association in Washington.
I agree it's word games, but that's hardly a surprise. Especially since Gore's denial seems a bit too narrow. What about the administration's policy on free //distribution// of encryption? That's what Louis Freeh wants to ban, as an initial move. -Declan
On Tue, 9 Sep 1997, Brock N. Meeks wrote:
Gore didn't say shit. Sorry but there is no polite way to say this. Gore's remarks at the SPA speech were a great example of "state speak" which the State Dept. has perfected, saying much and in "code" through the use of phrasing and even tone.
Let's look at what Gore did say:
WASHINGTON, Sept 9 (Reuter) - With the FBI floating a proposal to regulate the domestic use of computer encoding technology, Vice President Al Gore asserted Tuesday the administration had not changed its policy that allows free use within the United States. "The administration's decision has not changed on encryption, but this is an area where we need to find ways to work together to balance the legitimate needs of law enforcement with the needs of the marketplace," Gore told a meeting of the Software Publishers Association in Washington.
I agree it's word games, but that's hardly a surprise. Especially since Gore's denial seems a bit too narrow. What about the administration's policy on free //distribution// of encryption? That's what Louis Freeh wants to ban, as an initial move.
Declan -- No offence to you as a reporter, but I wouldn't trust Reuter's paraphrasing of what he said as far as I can throw my monitor. They paraphrase and then call it a quote. Does anyone have a transcript of what he actually said? The whole speech? It's not on the whitehouse site, nor CNN, nor the SPA site. -- Marshall Marshall Clow Aladdin Systems <mailto:mclow@mailhost2.csusm.edu> "In Washington DC, officials from the White House, federal agencies and Congress say regulations may be necessary to promote a free-market system." -- CommunicationsWeek International April 21, 1997
At 7:52 PM -0700 9/9/97, Declan McCullagh wrote:
On Tue, 9 Sep 1997, Jonah Seiger wrote:
I am not suggesting that we should relax because the Administration is not completely satisfied with this provision. They scored a hit against SAFE, just like we won one at the Foreign Relations Committee. Border skirmishes in the larger, ongoing war.
The war in Congress is essentially over. There is no realistic hope of good crypto legislation passing. I'd be interested to hear any hypothetical that you'd suggest to the contrary. Keep in mind when concocting it that you'd have to get past the Senate -- where pro-crypto legislation has been dead for months -- and a presidential veto.
Can you honestly say that any legislation that would survive such a fearsome test would be better than the situation we have now? (That is, no domestic controls, an export control regime hanging from a shoestring, and moderately successful court challenges.)
I was never enthusiastic about SAFE anyway. The criminalization language was bad news, and the approval language added along the way effectively gutted the bill. Face it, would it have allowed free export of arbitrarily strong, unbreakable crypto? If anyone thinks this, they're living in a fantasy world. And as Declan said, the Senate and the White House were very cold on SAFE. So why bother? Why give the NSA and FBI an opening for regulating _domestic_ crypto use just to let Netscape and Microsoft and a few other companies export to "furriners." (I support free exports, obviously, but not if it means restrictions in any way on existing liberties.) The "software as free speech, which means it can be subjected to prior restraint, government censorship, or export control" argument is proceeding nicely, thanks to Bernstein, Gilmore, Junger, Cohn, and others, and is a much more solid basis for ensuring civil liberties. Just drop all work on SAFE and Pro-CODE sorts of things and focus efforts on monkeywrenching GAK and widely distributing bootleg crypto around the world, as fast as possible. --Tim May There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws. Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!" ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay@got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^1398269 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."
I was talking to someone after a law class this evening (we're covering electronic privacy topics, but unfortunately we're not at crypto yet). He suggested widespread civil disobedience. Perhaps it's time to dare the Feds to prosecute you. Any volunteers? -Declan On Tue, 9 Sep 1997, Tim May wrote:
Just drop all work on SAFE and Pro-CODE sorts of things and focus efforts on monkeywrenching GAK and widely distributing bootleg crypto around the world, as fast as possible.
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I dare!! I double dare!! In <Pine.GSO.3.95.970909204903.1768B-100000@well.com>, on 09/09/97 at 08:51 PM, Declan McCullagh <declan@well.com> said:
I was talking to someone after a law class this evening (we're covering electronic privacy topics, but unfortunately we're not at crypto yet). He suggested widespread civil disobedience.
Perhaps it's time to dare the Feds to prosecute you. Any volunteers?
-Declan
On Tue, 9 Sep 1997, Tim May wrote:
Just drop all work on SAFE and Pro-CODE sorts of things and focus efforts on monkeywrenching GAK and widely distributing bootleg crypto around the world, as fast as possible.
- -- - --------------------------------------------------------------- William H. Geiger III http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii Geiger Consulting Cooking With Warp 4.0 Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail. OS/2 PGP 2.6.3a at: http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii/pgpmr2.html - --------------------------------------------------------------- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3a Charset: cp850 Comment: Registered_User_E-Secure_v1.1b1_ES000000 iQCVAwUBNBYjTo9Co1n+aLhhAQHONAQAvAISaWLYUm4fBNbmAxXe3VkAk7Zc4HCo XCGWJZmcZJMban1fnD3ESr7caUcngJqK+v5qiqDiEMHNmqPPVBIwwdvw/NjIrH20 LPEpRQbN2WjKn6JMPeU/jUqHYKOtnZwPuxuokJM7tj4kxbkaD7w1NgHbPQi4BhXi 3y4qTK64gwc= =svhs -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Declan McCullagh <declan@well.com> writes:
I was talking to someone after a law class this evening (we're covering electronic privacy topics, but unfortunately we're not at crypto yet). He suggested widespread civil disobedience.
Might I suggest using RSA in perl: print pack"C*",split/\D+/,`echo "16iII*o\U@{$/=$z;[(pop,pop,unpack"H*",<> )]}\EsMsKsN0[lN*1lK[d2%Sa2/d0<X+d*lMLa^*lN%0]dsXx++lMlN/dsM0<J]dsJxp"|dc` which is now officially non-exportable (as reported by Peter Junger; he asked for serveral code examples and this one was one of the non-exportable ones). Short enough to make them look silly, short enough that most people don't have qualms about quoting, or using as a .sig. And they've committed themselves in writing to Peter Junger that you're not allowed to export it.
Perhaps it's time to dare the Feds to prosecute you. Any volunteers?
Naturally I'm no use ... but y'all could have some fun. Adam -- Have *you* exported RSA today? --> http://www.dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/rsa/ print pack"C*",split/\D+/,`echo "16iII*o\U@{$/=$z;[(pop,pop,unpack"H*",<> )]}\EsMsKsN0[lN*1lK[d2%Sa2/d0<X+d*lMLa^*lN%0]dsXx++lMlN/dsM0<J]dsJxp"|dc`
Adam Back writes: : : Declan McCullagh <declan@well.com> writes: : > : > I was talking to someone after a law class this evening (we're covering : > electronic privacy topics, but unfortunately we're not at crypto yet). He : > suggested widespread civil disobedience. : : Might I suggest using RSA in perl: : : print pack"C*",split/\D+/,`echo "16iII*o\U@{$/=$z;[(pop,pop,unpack"H*",<> : )]}\EsMsKsN0[lN*1lK[d2%Sa2/d0<X+d*lMLa^*lN%0]dsXx++lMlN/dsM0<J]dsJxp"|dc` : : which is now officially non-exportable (as reported by Peter Junger; : he asked for serveral code examples and this one was one of the : non-exportable ones). Short enough to make them look silly, short : enough that most people don't have qualms about quoting, or using as a : .sig. And they've committed themselves in writing to Peter Junger : that you're not allowed to export it. For the classification by the commerce department of the programs that my Legal Attack Team submitted, and for the applications, see <http://samsara.law.cwru.edu/comp_law/jvd/index.html>. It is unlikely that we will be seeking further classifications in connection with my suit, but it might be an interesting and useful project---not involving civil disobedience---for some of you. It would be interesting to see exactly which encryption programs the bureaucrats classify as encryption programs, and which they don't. It would also be interesting to see if they give the same classifications in response to requests by those who are not suing them. I must, however, warn you that it is not an easy project. It cannot be done by e-mail and you have to get numbered forms from Commerce Department on which the applications must be submitted. In fact, the difficulty of applying for a classification or a license is one of the many reasons for concluding that the export restrictions on cryptography violate the United States Constitution. It would certainly be helpful if it turned out that that Commerce cannot or will not respond promptly to classification requests made by would-be publishers of cryptographic software who are neither commercial publishers nor suing to enjoin the enforcement of the regulations. -- Peter D. Junger--Case Western Reserve University Law School--Cleveland, OH EMAIL: junger@samsara.law.cwru.edu URL: http://samsara.law.cwru.edu NOTE: junger@pdj2-ra.f-remote.cwru.edu no longer exists
Tim May writes: : The "software as free speech, which means it can be subjected to prior : restraint, government censorship, or export control" argument is proceeding : nicely, thanks to Bernstein, Gilmore, Junger, Cohn, and others, and is a : much more solid basis for ensuring civil liberties. Uhrr . . . . I don't think that is quite the way we phrased the argument. -- Peter D. Junger--Case Western Reserve University Law School--Cleveland, OH EMAIL: junger@samsara.law.cwru.edu URL: http://samsara.law.cwru.edu NOTE: junger@pdj2-ra.f-remote.cwru.edu no longer exists
participants (11)
-
Adam Back -
amp＠pobox.com -
Black Unicorn -
Brock N. Meeks -
Declan McCullagh -
Jonah Seiger -
Lucky Green -
Marshall Clow -
Peter D. Junger -
Tim May -
William H. Geiger III