It's clear that NSA is opposed to triple-DES because it cannot break it. I'm not supprised the banks are going ahead even if

Forwarding Cyberia-L mail by: dcain@pioneer.uspto.gov (David Cain) on Wed, 23 Nov 7:8 AM ------------------- John Thomas writes: triple-DES cannot be

exported; it will be trivial to develop the hardware overseas, since all the algorithms are public.

Although NSA will neither confirm nor deny <grin> one of the fundamental principles of cryptography is that any encryption system which cannot be broken is also inefficient - like the one-time-pad. NSA may be concerned with allocation of CRAY resources, but I doubt they are concerned about the viability of breaking triple-DES. One of the most important concepts of cryptography is that false security is worse than poor security, for if you are aware of a system's vulnerability, you can guard the weak points. NSA's point that layering encryptions not only doesn't strengthen the security, but may create patterning that is more susceptible to differential analysis than a single DES pass, is an important one. More is frequently less in crypto. Now, I have no more insight into NSA motivations than the next shmoe, but the objections they raise are legitimate from a security standpoint. As for independent creation in Europe, there is a component to "real" hardware DES which is classified. dc Primary Examiner USPTO Cryptography David Cain * Speaking for no one * Escape to find the shining light dcain@uspto.gov * Borne within evolving sight dcain@osf1.gmu.edu *