Why This List Is A Security Risk
Setting policy on national security risk for the entire USG, the DoD proclaims a trustworthy person does not engage in the following: Sec. 147.14 Guideline L--Outside activities. (a) The concern. Involvement in certain types of outside employment or activities is of security concern if it poses a conflict with an individual's security responsibilities and could create an increased risk of unauthorized disclosure of classified information. (b) Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include any service, whether compensated, volunteer, or employment with: (1) A foreign country; (2) Any foreign national; (3) A representative of any foreign interest; (4) Any foreign, domestic, or international organization or person engaged in analysis, discussion, or publication of material on intelligence, defense, foreign affairs, or protected technology. -----
From 32 CFR Part 147 published today.
Eric Hughes was discussion out-of-band attacks on security systems, such as providing the target's employees with opportunities for "simultaneous employment" :-) However, as the last part of section (4) says, you've got to be careful of those suspicious foreign cryptographers.... At 09:05 PM 1/30/98 -0500, John Young wrote:
Setting policy on national security risk for the entire USG, the DoD proclaims a trustworthy person does not engage in the following:
Sec. 147.14 Guideline L--Outside activities.
(a) The concern. Involvement in certain types of outside employment or activities is of security concern if it poses a conflict with an individual's security responsibilities and could create an increased risk of unauthorized disclosure of classified information. (b) Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include any service, whether compensated, volunteer, or employment with: (1) A foreign country; (2) Any foreign national; (3) A representative of any foreign interest; (4) Any foreign, domestic, or international organization or person engaged in analysis, discussion, or publication of material on intelligence, defense, foreign affairs, or protected technology.
From 32 CFR Part 147 published today.
Thanks! Bill Bill Stewart, bill.stewart@pobox.com PGP Fingerprint D454 E202 CBC8 40BF 3C85 B884 0ABE 4639
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(4) Any foreign, domestic, or international organization or person engaged in analysis, discussion, or publication of material on intelligence, defense, foreign affairs, or protected technology.
that must be why the federal assholes have always denied aps for clearance, we are bunch of fucking subversives! <g> of course, I know better than that: more than once having told representatives of the criminal class that I may sell my services on the market, but I am not your, not my, government's whore. unfortunately, (yeah, right!) they have taken a dim view of me --and most anyone I associate with. well, fuck 'em if they cant take a joke --criticism is part of freedom and when the govcritters figure out they represent us, not own us; and when they stop hypocritically dictating policy to the rest of the world, maybe we'll have something to talk about. and, if that last statement comes true, I'll not only believe in the tooth fairy, but I'll throw in the fairy godmother for a bonus. shit, I'll even toss in a godfather or two... attila out... grousing === whole text from jya === on or about 980130:2105, in <1.5.4.32.19980131020517.00720848@pop.pipeline.com>, John Young <jya@pipeline.com> was purported to have expostulated to perpetuate an opinion:
Setting policy on national security risk for the entire USG, the DoD proclaims a trustworthy person does not engage in the following:
Sec. 147.14 Guideline L--Outside activities.
(a) The concern. Involvement in certain types of outside employment or activities is of security concern if it poses a conflict with an individual's security responsibilities and could create an increased risk of unauthorized disclosure of classified information. (b) Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include any service, whether compensated, volunteer, or employment with: (1) A foreign country; (2) Any foreign national; (3) A representative of any foreign interest; (4) Any foreign, domestic, or international organization or person engaged in analysis, discussion, or publication of material on intelligence, defense, foreign affairs, or protected technology.
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From 32 CFR Part 147 published today.
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participants (3)
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Attila T. Hun -
Bill Stewart -
John Young