Re: FCPUNX:PGP Key Escrow and Congress
Bruce Schneier wrote:
From: "Barbara Simons" <simons@VNET.IBM.COM>
Some of these are old arguments that we've been hearing for a while, but some are newer. In particular, points 4 and 6 are difficult to refute without getting into some technical details. Both points also undercut the argument that a key recovery infrastructure potentially weakens security. After all, the NSA thinks it's secure enough that it can be used by the government.
Non-technical point: the NSA (reportedly) has no intention of using GAK for classified information. They know that it weakens security. Do the privacy of the nation's data and the security of its information infrastructure deserve the same consideration as the Pentagon's "Confidential" memos? When you're planning to build in a single point of failure, this is a question you have to ask. -- Eli Brandt | eli+@cs.cmu.edu | http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~eli/
In <199710151811.LAA23906@toad.com>, on 10/15/97 at 02, Eli Brandt <eli@gs160.sp.cs.cmu.edu> said:
Bruce Schneier wrote:
From: "Barbara Simons" <simons@VNET.IBM.COM>
Some of these are old arguments that we've been hearing for a while, but some are newer. In particular, points 4 and 6 are difficult to refute without getting into some technical details. Both points also undercut the argument that a key recovery infrastructure potentially weakens security. After all, the NSA thinks it's secure enough that it can be used by the government.
Non-technical point: the NSA (reportedly) has no intention of using GAK for classified information. They know that it weakens security.
Do the privacy of the nation's data and the security of its information infrastructure deserve the same consideration as the Pentagon's "Confidential" memos? When you're planning to build in a single point of failure, this is a question you have to ask.
There are those of us who see a single point of failure in such infrastructures as a GoodThing(TM). -- --------------------------------------------------------------- William H. Geiger III http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii Geiger Consulting Cooking With Warp 4.0 Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail. OS/2 PGP 2.6.3a at: http://www.amaranth.com/~whgiii/pgpmr2.html ---------------------------------------------------------------
At 01:27 PM 10/15/1997 -0500, William H. Geiger III wrote:
Do the privacy of the nation's data and the security of its information infrastructure deserve the same consideration as the Pentagon's "Confidential" memos? When you're planning to build in a single point of failure, this is a question you have to ask.
There are those of us who see a single point of failure in such infrastructures as a GoodThing(TM).
However, they are incorrect :-) The primary failure mode is "someone official decides to rip off somebody's information". A single point of failure means there's one big temptation target where every official can rip off everybody's information - but in this case that failure will not be repaired: - it won't be reported most of the time, and undetected failures are the worst. - the cost of redesigning the system will be so large that even a glaring massive public failure won't lead to shutting it down. - the least-bad "fix" for the problem will be to add official bureaucracy to the process of ripping off info, and maybe the individual miscreant will get wrist-slapped harshly. - the failure will be blamed on the Four Horseman, not the system - the probable "cure" will be to appoint a Data Privacy Ombudsczar, who will have authority to interfere with all sorts of private data but won't mess with the big Federal infrastructure. Multiple small points of failure mean that it's less likely that the official who wants to rip off information has access to the set of information he wants to rip off. You could argue that there would be more officials with access, but probably not, since a big pile of information is something that attracts officials far faster than little boring piles. Thanks! Bill Bill Stewart, stewarts@ix.netcom.com Regular Key PGP Fingerprint D454 E202 CBC8 40BF 3C85 B884 0ABE 4639
on or about 971015:1952 Bill Stewart <stewarts@ix.netcom.com> was purported to have expostulated to perpetuate an opinion: #Multiple small points of failure mean that it's less likely #that the official who wants to rip off information has access #to the set of information he wants to rip off. You could argue #that there would be more officials with access, but probably not, since a big #pile of information is something that attracts officials far faster than #little boring piles. TRUER WORDS WERE NEVER SPOKEN! attila "attila" sig: 1024/C20B6905/23D0 FA7F 6A8F 6066 BCAF AE56 98C0 D7B0
On Wed, Oct 15, 1997 at 07:52:47PM -0700, Bill Stewart wrote:
At 01:27 PM 10/15/1997 -0500, William H. Geiger III wrote:
Do the privacy of the nation's data and the security of its information infrastructure deserve the same consideration as the Pentagon's "Confidential" memos? When you're planning to build in a single point of failure, this is a question you have to ask.
There are those of us who see a single point of failure in such infrastructures as a GoodThing(TM).
However, they are incorrect :-) The primary failure mode is "someone official decides to rip off somebody's information". [...]
Multiple small points of failure mean that it's less likely that the official who wants to rip off information has access to the set of information he wants to rip off. You could argue that there would be more officials with access, but probably not, since a big pile of information is something that attracts officials far faster than little boring piles.
I don't suppose you are arguing that having multiple small points of failure makes GAK acceptable... The 'single point of failure' mode is such obviously bad design that NSA will never go for it -- they aren't dumb. Consider that if you have a single master key for all escrowed things (for example): that single master key will have to be used for *every* wiretap, every FOI act action, etc. It will be in constant daily use by many people, and keeping it secure will be, practically speaking, impossible. -- Kent Crispin "No reason to get excited", kent@songbird.com the thief he kindly spoke... PGP fingerprint: B1 8B 72 ED 55 21 5E 44 61 F4 58 0F 72 10 65 55 http://songbird.com/kent/pgp_key.html
participants (5)
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Attila T. Hun -
Bill Stewart -
Eli Brandt -
Kent Crispin -
William H. Geiger III