crypto for porno users
crypto for porno users Crypto porno is a wonderful topic for Cypherpunks. Child porno people are a group that definitely needs the very best in computer security. If their computer security problems are solved, then everybodys' computer security problems are solved. COMPUTER SITE DISK SECURITY The SecureDrive 1.4 disk encryptor system solves their computer site disk storage problem. It also gives them the solution to the "rubber hose" problem. With a "damaged" key file and the use of a password, they have an effective defense against court orders demanding keys. (see the docs for SecureDrive 1.4). Also disk encryptors not only encrypt files but also solve the problem of temporary work files that are used by many software packages (They can be reconstructed). TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECURITY MIT's PGP 2.6.2 solves their problem of secure telecommunications. This assumes that the people involved can really trust each other. STATE INFILTRATOR PROBLEM Of course, one of the really big problems for non-STATE approved groups is the problem of state agents infiltrating the group. This gets worse as the group gets bigger. This is also one more thing I have against states - one of their jobs is having their agents make friends with cit- izens and then betray their friends. Has anyone else noticed? - THE STATE HAS NO HONOR! The state prides itself on its cleverness here. Also, of course, once the state has entrapped an individual, they tend to get other members of the group by having their victims get and give evidence against other members. - sort of a domino effect and the group unravels - especially with the conspiracy laws. Drug distribution gangs are famous for falling to these techniques. A possibly unbreakable defense against the above assault would be the use of a Dining Cryptographers protocol. According to Applied Crypto- graphy, PGP may be used to send messages in these protocols. Pretend that a small group of Cypherpunks are child porn enthusiasts and decide to use the Cypherpunk mailing list to exchange pictures and child porn info.. I know little of the theory of Dining Cryptographers but I would think that a good implementation of it would make infiltrators useless. I will leave it for other Cypherpunks to discuss the mechanics (specific and general) for actually doing this. A possible risk would be that this would put the general membership of Cypherpunks at risk - or would it just put the list itself to risk? Does this imply that we need FORTRESS mailing lists or what others would des- cribe as COERCION-FREE mailing lists? Would remailers that allow two way secure communication be a help here? Would they be forced to be FORTRESS or COERCION-FREE to be effective? Should they use expendable lists?:-) Generally, if you wanted to start a discussion group on a forbidden topic on the Internet, and wanted to keep it secure - how would you do it? Today this is an academic question - but tomorrow? :-) Aside from workable anonymous Internet money, the two most needed computer privacy technologies are fortress mailing lists and remailers and workable Dining Cryptographers protocols. THE UNITED STATES "FEDERAL" GOVERNMENT HAS NO LEGITIMACY. The United States "Federal" Government - We'll be even more American without it. PUSH EM BACK! PUSH EM BACK! WWWAAAYYYY BBBAAACCCCK! BBBEEEAAATTTT STATE! Gary Jeffers
Watch the cpunks go round and round and round and... On Fri, 24 Nov 1995, Gary Jeffers wrote:
I know little of the theory of Dining Cryptographers but I would think that a good implementation of it would make infiltrators useless. I will leave it for other Cypherpunks to discuss the mechanics (specific and general) for actually doing this.
Dining Cryptographers nets (aka DC-nets) are the whole idea behind the type 2 anon remailers like Mixmaster, and the remailernet in general. You'll find a lot on this in the archives, the ftp site (which has Chaum's DC article and a good explanation by Tim May) and a few peoples' pages. (I think they're mostly pointed to in the pages I list) You'll find Mixmaster at <http://obscura.com/~loki/Welcome.html> Wei Dai posted some articles a few months ago about traffic analysis of such remailers. He still has one of them at <http://www.eskimo.com/~weidai> Sameer also has a two-way encrypted-command remailer. Check out <http://www.c2.org> for details. The archives are at <http://www.hks.net/cpunks/index.html> (I realize this has been posted n zillion times) Wasn't there a DC-net mailing list once upon a time? (Tim mentions it in some of his writings) Did this wither away or merge into the remailer-ops list?
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