Re: Newt's phone calls

Adam Back <aba@dcs.ex.ac.uk> wrote in article <5bp18k$1cc@life.ai.mit.edu>...
GSM encrypts only the links to the station - the traffic goes in the clear through the station. Plus A5 (crypto algorithm used in GSM) is weak, 40 bits of effective key space.
It could be worse to have poor crypto, than no crypto,
I disagree for two reasons, first there is a big difference between having poor locks and no locks. Most locks can be picked by an expert, they are effective against many theifs however. Second if everyone in the world was using 40 bit email encryption it would prevent most of the "promiscuous" interception of communications. The danger in weak crypto is thinking that it is strong crypto. GSM is weak crypto but stops the type of snooping the Martins engaged in. If you know not to talk about something secret on one then low crypto is better than having a signal anyone can pick up on a device from radio shack. Phill

Phillip M. Hallam-Baker writes:
Adam Back <aba@dcs.ex.ac.uk> wrote in article <5bp18k$1cc@life.ai.mit.edu>...
It could be worse to have poor crypto, than no crypto,
I disagree for two reasons,
[ snip]
The danger in weak crypto is thinking that it is strong crypto. GSM is weak crypto but stops the type of snooping the Martins engaged in. If you know not to talk about something secret on one then low crypto is better than having a signal anyone can pick up on a device from radio shack.
No, the real danger in weak crypto is that the poorly-informed will not think about it *at all*. If we had "poor crypto", Newt probably wouldn't have been embarrassed by this sort of casual interception, and the issue wouldn't have been raised in the public mind. But our communications still wouldn't be safe from more determined attackers. Brouhahas like these are good for the pro-(strong-)crypto agenda. -- Jeff
participants (2)
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Jeff Barber
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Phillip M. Hallam-Baker