game theoretic analysis of junk mail

The junk mail problem (also known as spam) is well known to just about everyone who receives e-mail. There has also been many solutions proposed. Noticeably, the idea of having e-mail senders include ecash payments with their mail has come up several times (I believe as the result of independent discovery). In order to evaluate the effectiveness of this proposal, I will construct a game theoretic model of the interaction between the sender and the recipient of an e-mail, and compare the solutions with and without the ecash payment option. The Model Players: A - Sender, B - Recipient A: Send mail? / \ no / \ yes / \ (0,0) B: Read mail? / \ no / \ yes / \ (0,0) B: Accept offer? / \ no / \ yes / \ (0,-c) (s,r-c) Assumptions: - sending the e-mail is costless to the sender - c (the cost of reading a piece of e-mail) is known to both the sender and the recipient. - s and r (the profit of the proposed deal to sender and receiver, respectively, both assumed to be non-negative) are distributed according to the probability density function f(s,r). The sender knows s and r before sending the e-mail, but the receiver does not learn s and r until he reads the e-mail. Solution of the game: To solve this game, we apply the method of backward induction. In the last stage of the game, B decides whether to accept A's offer. Clearly he always accepts since r-c >= -c. Therefore, in the next to last stage, B knows that the expected payoff if he reads the mail is the expected value of r-c, E(r)-c, so he will read if E(r)-c > 0. Finally, we come to A's decision. If A knows that B will not read, then he is indifferent between sending and not sending. However, if we assume that there is a small probability that B will read and accept irrationally, then we can conclude that A always sends the mail. Conclusions To summerize, if E(r) > c, B always reads the mail and accepts the offer, otherwise B never reads. A always sends regardless of the value of the parameters. Now we can see the outcome is not socially optimal. For example if E(r) < c, both A and B would be better off if A only sends when r>c. The above model is not very realistic. The most unrealistic assumption is that the sender knows the exactly value of his offer to the recipient. However I believe the model captures the essence of the junk mail problem. Next time I will analyze the proposed solution of adding the option of a pre-payment. For those who want to try it themselves, I give the game tree here: A: Send mail? / \ no / \ yes / \ (0,0) A: Decide pre-payment p | | | B: Read mail? / \ no / \ yes / \ (-p,p) B: Accept offer? / \ no / \ yes / \ (-p,p-c) (s,r-c)

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Wei Dai! Long time no read! I hope to see more articles from you. A million monkeys operating under the pseudonym "Wei Dai <weidai@eskimo.com>" typed:
The junk mail problem (also known as spam) is well known to just about everyone who receives e-mail. There has also been many solutions proposed. Noticeably, the idea of having e-mail senders include ecash payments with their mail has come up several times (I believe as the result of independent discovery).
I've suggested it several times. I'm curious who else has proposed it. <snip on game model of problem> Nice! I look forward to part 2. (And part 3, where you go ahead and account for the cost of signing up for digital payment systems and the cost of managing each deposit/payment...) I think the major problems with the proposal are first making digital payment systems ubiquitous and second making the "unsolicited mail good faith deposit" idea ubiquitous. Hm. If we could somehow make the _idea_ gain.. er.. "currency" then the problem of spammers would cause more people to adopt digital payment systems. _That_ would be making a blessing from a curse! Regards, Zooko Journeyman, a.k.a. Bryce PGP sig follows -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2i Comment: Auto-signed under Unix with 'BAP' Easy-PGP v1.1b2 iQB0AwUBMzky/UjbHy8sKZitAQE3BwL4/q+EP2pw0GebNFXWirFevp4DZgIa2CAM hWAB8JacWzkUydT4jZkqKJS9OheBB6yIcfC1z/rgc74TTm4CilYUblfyYjR20/sj 8ndDM5L7DyEn73WAmgWOWyVlf0MHa8M= =Pn7e -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
participants (2)
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Bryce
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Wei Dai