Broadcasts and the Rendezvous Problem
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Seems to me that one of the fundamental building blocks necessary to a host of anonymous services is a means of rendezvousing in a manner that is not vulnerable to traffic analysis. The obvious solution to this is through the use of a broadcast medium. Has anybody created an alt.* group purely for remailer-associated rendezvous? If not, it seems like that would be a very worthwhile direction to pursue: with such a mechanism, nodes of a "remailer net" can surface and disappear with minimal disruption to the net. Folks spend a lot of time bemoaning the transience of specific instances of remailer nodes: why not turn this into an advantage by architecting a network of system that is resilient against the destruction and/or compromise of individual nodes? - -- Todd Masco | "'When _I_ use a word,' Humpty-Dumpty said, in a rather cactus@hks.net | scornful tone, 'it means just what I choose it to mean - cactus@bb.com | neither more nor less.'" - Lewis Carroll - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBLut3AioZzwIn1bdtAQHocwGAq/KWiFGi2nJ4Kuve/0jUv1xX5aAJknWc NRfJUts3Y0PfKZZbSETEwYPNfX48O4TB =NIBb -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
L. Todd Masco wrote:
Seems to me that one of the fundamental building blocks necessary to a host of anonymous services is a means of rendezvousing in a manner that is not vulnerable to traffic analysis.
The obvious solution to this is through the use of a broadcast medium. Has anybody created an alt.* group purely for remailer-associated rendezvous?
Isn't this what "alt.anonymous.messages" is all about? (It's been at my Netcom site for many months now...I don't recall who created it, but it seems to me it was one of us.) Miron Cuperman ran a message pool for a while....I don't know the current status. Other options exist, but all are lightly-trafficked. When more users are using them, expect more such places.
Folks spend a lot of time bemoaning the transience of specific instances of remailer nodes: why not turn this into an advantage by architecting a network of system that is resilient against the destruction and/or compromise of individual nodes?
I'm not sure what you mean by this. More remailers are always a good thing, and offshore sites are especially good, but I'm not sure what you mean by your last point. --Tim May -- .......................................................................... Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay@netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^859433 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available. Cypherpunks list: majordomo@toad.com with body message of only: subscribe cypherpunks. FAQ available at ftp.netcom.com in pub/tc/tcmay
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