Eric, please can you clarify
Eric, Can you clarify your intention for the list ? I'm a little puzzled by the alternatives that are flying about. You initially stated an intention to delay (eventually bounce) unsigned messages to cypherpunks list. A couple of posts back you talked about "This is an unsigned message" headers in messages. Are you intending to implement both of these, one of these, or one now and the other later ? What type of checking are you intending on signatures - just syntax or signature verification ? I apologize for asking for clarification, but I've lost the signal in amongst all this noise. -Jon -- Jonathon Fletcher, j.fletcher@stirling.ac.uk (X400: "/S=jf1/O=stirling/PRMD=uk.ac/C=gb/")
From: Jonathon Fletcher <j.fletcher@stirling.ac.uk> Can you clarify your intention for the list ? I'm a little puzzled by the alternatives that are flying about. The first time this got debated was last year. There the proposal was check sigs, delay, eventually bounce. That's not what I'm proposing this time. I mentioned this again, and the discussion started up again. Almost at once I wanted to avoid the flames from the previous time, so I restricted the proposal to be for marking and delaying only. Are you intending to implement both of these, one of these, or one now and the other later ? First of all, I'm not "planning" on any right now. I am considering doing some of them and I have decided to do some related work. The first action would be autonag; messages sent back to non-signers from the server. The second would be automark; header fields for advocacy would be added to the messages. The third would be delay for some as yet unspecified interval. The timing of these is not decided, and would certainly be iterative. What type of checking are you intending on signatures - just syntax or signature verification ? At first, only syntax checking. The problems of key distribution prevent otherwise. I apologize for asking for clarification, but I've lost the signal in amongst all this noise. No, actually, a summary was in order. Eric
Eric Hughes writes
At first, only syntax checking. The problems of key distribution prevent otherwise.
So autonag every nym to send a public key in. Every email has its nym checked. No key for that nym, auto nag Discrepant signature, flag. No signature, autonag. This would be actually useful. It provides a benefit, thus demonstrating the usefulness of crypto, and would achieve the goals that you desire (get us to sign our stuff) without making us look like seven year olds. What you are proposing provides no benefit. It is crypto for the sake of crypto. This makes us look like kids in mighty-morphing-power-ranger suits, playing with captain Krunch secret decoder key rings. A check on syntax without semantics looks pathetic, in the same way, and for the same reasons, as a captain Krunch secret decoder ring. -- --------------------------------------------------------------------- We have the right to defend ourselves and our property, because of the kind of animals that we James A. Donald are. True law derives from this right, not from the arbitrary power of the omnipotent state. jamesd@acm.org
From: "James A. Donald" <jamesd@netcom.com> Date: Thu, 1 Dec 1994 19:15:35 -0800 (PST) So autonag every nym to send a public key in. Where do you send the autonag message? Do you trust the From: or Reply-To: fields? Rick
Rick Busdiecker writes
From: "James A. Donald" <jamesd@netcom.com> Date: Thu, 1 Dec 1994 19:15:35 -0800 (PST)
So autonag every nym to send a public key in.
Where do you send the autonag message? Do you trust the From: or Reply-To: fields?
It does not matter who the true identity associated with a public key is. My proposal is only that signatures be checked for consistent identity, not true name. Requiring true names would be most uncypherpunk. So it would be up to the nym to get his true public key to the list, not up to the list to discover the correct public key that signs a posting by a nym. -- --------------------------------------------------------------------- We have the right to defend ourselves and our property, because of the kind of animals that we James A. Donald are. True law derives from this right, not from the arbitrary power of the omnipotent state. jamesd@acm.org
From: jamesd@netcom.com (James A. Donald) Date: Fri, 2 Dec 1994 15:33:19 -0800 (PST) Rick Busdiecker writes > > From: "James A. Donald" <jamesd@netcom.com> > Date: Thu, 1 Dec 1994 19:15:35 -0800 (PST) > > So autonag every nym to send a public key in. > > Where do you send the autonag message? Do you trust the From: or > Reply-To: fields? It does not matter who the true identity associated with a public key is. My proposal is only that signatures be checked for consistent identity, not true name. Hmmm. I thought that you had also suggesting that this mechanism should ``autonag every nym to send a public key in'' which I thought raised the question of ``Where do you send the autnoag messages?'' Perhaps you meant for the autonag to be a notice attached to the distributed message? Rick
participants (4)
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eric＠remailer.net -
jamesd＠netcom.com -
Jonathon Fletcher -
Rick Busdiecker