Rivest's Chaffing and Winnowing
The New York Times, March 22, 1998, p. 31. New Method To Veil Data Could Upstage Export Policy Cryptologists find a way to foil eavesdroppers without secret codes. By John Markoff San Francisco, March 21 -- One of the nation's leading computer scientists has proposed a novel technique for scrambling data that could circumvent Government export policies aimed at limiting the foreign sale of encryption technology. The technique, which was described this week in an Internet discussion among computer researchers, was introduced by Ronald L. Rivest, a computer scientist at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and one of the inventors of the most widely used commercial encryption scheme, RSA. The new approach, which is described in a short technical paper that has been posted to Mr. Rivest's M.I.T. Web site (http://theory.lcs.mit.edu/~rivest/chaffing.txt), is described as "chaffing and winnowing" digital information instead of encrypting it. According to Mr. Rivest's paper, it is possible to hide a message by breaking it into packets that are then secretly identified as good information, or "wheat," and gibberish, or "chaff," in such a way that an eavesdropper cannot distinguish the two. Because the individual packets would not be encrypted, Mr. Rivest said, such a system would circumvent current export restrictions. The two principal ways of communicating in secret are encryption and steganography. Steganography uses computer techniques to embed a secret message in a document like a digital image. In encryption, secret information is encoded using functions that require difficult mathematical tasks to decode, and it has become the standard way of transmitting secret information electronically. There are no restrictions on the domestic use of this technology, but the Government has been trying to force the industry to adopt standards that would permit law-enforcement officials to have mathematical keys allowing them to decode messages without the knowledge of the sender or receiver. The Clinton Administration says the standards are needed to fight crime and terrorism. Opponents argue that the Government decoding keys, to be stored in computers, could easily be stolen, compromising privacy and the security of credit card numbers and other personal information. In terms of exports, with few exceptions the Government limits the software to codes that can be easily broken. "Winnowing does not employ encryption, and so does not have a 'decryption key,' " Mr. Rivest wrote in his paper. "As usual, the policy debate about regulating technology ends up being obsoleted by technological innovations." Peter Neumann, an SRI International computer scientist who has read Mr. Rivest's paper, said that although "there is still no certainty that this is a practical idea," if it works, "it throws another clinker at the Justice Department." Other cryptography experts said they were uncertain whether it would be possible to skirt Government export restrictions in this way, but that the idea was an impressive new approach that might have valuable commercial applications. "He's a very clever guy," said George Spix, a Microsoft researcher who specializes in cryptography policy issues. " It goes to show that for all the technological wizardry in the world, there's nothing like an intellect." One of the potential limitations of the new method is that the total information transmitted might need to be hundreds of times larger than the actual message. Mr. Rivest said, however, that he had discussed the idea with Adi Shamir, an Israeli cryptographer, and that Mr. Shamir had proposed compression methods that would reduce the total transmission to only about twice the actual message size. The strength of the idea for chaffing and winnowing is that it is possible to prove mathematically that a message cannot be decoded, Mr. Rivest said. He said he had come up with the idea recently while teaching an undergraduate computer course. In addition to his role as associate director of the Laboratory of Computer Science at M.I.T., Mr. Rivest is a consultant and shareholder in RSA Data Security Inc., a company that develops encryption software. "I put the winnowing and chaffing idea out there to stimulate debate,"' Mr. Rivest said. "I hope it will help clear up some of the issues that have been raised in the policy discussion. [End]
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- On Sun, 22 Mar 1998, John Young wrote:
The New York Times, March 22, 1998, p. 31.
New Method To Veil Data Could Upstage Export Policy
Cryptologists find a way to foil eavesdroppers without secret codes.
As if steganography was new.
The new approach, which is described in a short technical paper that has been posted to Mr. Rivest's M.I.T. Web site (http://theory.lcs.mit.edu/~rivest/chaffing.txt), is described as "chaffing and winnowing" digital information instead of encrypting it.
Using steganoraphic techniques on low-level elements of network communication (packets) was considered many years ago in this very forum. A particular suggestion seemed much more effective than Rivest's proposal. It aim was to hide information among seemingly innocuous communication. Whereas, it is obvious to any observer of a "chaffing" exchange that an abnormal exchange was taking place. Of course, if all communication was "chaffed" then that same exchange would seem perfectly ordinary. However, the chaffing technique (creating "bogus" packets, transmitting them along with the real information, and seperating the two) creates a lot of overhead... which may not use much bandwidth if used occasionally, but would create a serious problem if everyone did it all the time.
According to Mr. Rivest's paper, it is possible to hide a message by breaking it into packets that are then secretly identified as good information, or "wheat," and gibberish, or "chaff," in such a way that an eavesdropper cannot distinguish the two.
The earlier suggestion was to hide information in unused, least significant, portions of the packet _header_, leaving the data portion intact. Thus, the overhead of creating "bogus" packets is eliminated, the bandwidth used in sending them is conserved, and the processing power used in seperating the "wheat" from the "chaff" is freed. Further, by all accounts, the data transmitted would seem perfectly ordinary to an eavesdropper. It could be a poem or a picture. However, it would be completely irrelevant, as the real message is hidden in the header. Finally, there are the more traditional steganographic techniques such as using the least significant bits of gifs, jpegs, and wavs. And, most intriguing of all, mimic functions. ............................................................................ . Sergey Goldgaber <sergey@el.net> Senior System Engineer . ............................................................................ . To him who does not know the world is on fire, I have nothing to say . . - Bertholt Brecht . ............................................................................ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBNRVG+Mgbnd/MibbZAQEaRwP9Fy825U05t9xyHa0vN5wFFCNBR0NHrik0 cFBG357a1+MRA90uxvUztB736uf71a39HP0172sjyAg3TXVG9MEpCxFDDa6OZAWQ 9Xgq9TSaUTJUXJVsockFTHF6F9zDLIAvw2s365J4dr3++Uj/JreaaX7pcLVmCujO DkuInR89aG8= =B9nV -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
participants (2)
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John Young
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Sergey Goldgaber