Rep. Loretta Sanchez Hits Crypto Controls

The Sanchez statement is from House Report 105-108, Part 3, published September 12 by the National Security Committee, which describes the Weldon-Dellums amendment to SAFE. See the full report at: http://jya.com/hr105-108-pt3.htm The report includes a cost estimate by the Congressional Budget Officefor implementing SAFE. However, as far as I can tell, the estimate does not include the cost of a GAK system, and covers only the cost of export controls. Thus, it appears to be vastly misleading. SUPPLEMENTAL VIEWS OF HON. LORETTA SANCHEZ Many of us when we think of encryption imagine the ``ENIGMA'' code breaking machines of World War Two or the American Indian ``code talkers'' that helped us anticipate and defeat Nazi and Imperial Japanese attacks. Those methods were mechanical or human-based, and often depended on simple arithmetical slight of hand to trick the enemy. Today, encryption is complex mathematical algorithms that have become an entirely new branch of mathematics involving intense academic study. Until recently encryption was limited to governments and large companies through U.S. export limitations and by the limitations of existing hardware and software technologies. All that began to change as the desktop computer became more prevalent and the computing power available to the average user jumped by leaps and bounds every year. When discussing the power of the PC observers of the information technology industry often predict that the computing power of microprocessors would double roughly every 18 months. Because of this the rapidly developing speed and growth of computers, the age of the ``unbreakable code'' has long since passed. Manufacturers of encryption technology are engaged in a rapidly accelerating race to develop the newest and strongest code that can withstand attacks from the increasingly powerful computers of the day. And it isn't just big companies and governments that have the technology to break codes. Last January, a graduate student broke a 40-bit code in just three- and-a-half hours, the toughest code form American companies at the time were allowed to export. Today, American companies are the world leaders in encryption technology, but other companies and nations are catching up. Strong encryption products and knowledge about the science of cryptography is not limited to the United States. A savvy computer user anywhere in the world can with just a few clicks of the mouse find U.S. export-embargoed encryption. Many freelancing code hackers maintain off-shore Internet meeting sites to discuss the newest holes in encryption products. The proposed export controls which the Administration argues helps to keep strong encryption out of the hands of foreign adversaries will have little or no effect. Strong encryption is available abroad and US companies are being put at a competitive disadvantage in the global marketplace. With this bleak and seemingly hopeless picture in mind how do we protect ourselves from the threat of rogue nations and other adversaries cloaking their communications from American National Security efforts? The only viable solution is through supporting a robust and aggressively competitive cryptography industry in the United States. We must ensure that the United States continues to maintain the deepest pool of cryptographic experts in the world. American export limitations will only serve to create a brain drain of these precious resources as leading scientists leave our shores for more lucrative and accommodating surroundings. All of us care about our national security and no one wants to make it any easier for criminals and terrorists to commit criminal acts. But we must also recognize encryption technologies as an increasingly sharp double-edged sword. It can also aid law enforcement and protect national security by limiting the threat of industrial espionage and foreign spying, but only when Americans are able to produce the sharpest swords and the strongest encryption. I would also like to state for the record that for the reasons stated above, I do not support the Dellums-Weldon Amendment to H.R. 695, and would have voted against it. Loretta Sanchez. ----------

At 22:22 -0400 9/20/97, John Young wrote:
Budget Officefor implementing SAFE. However, as far as I can tell, the estimate does not include the cost of a GAK system, and covers only the cost of export controls. Thus, it appears to be vastly misleading.
Those were the earlier estimates, based on legislation that did not include mandatory GAK. I wrote about the latest CBO estimate, based on mandatory GAK, in this week's Time Magazine. -Declan ------------------------- Declan McCullagh Washington Correspondent, The Netly News Network, http://netlynews.com/ Reporter, Time Magazine, http://time.com/

SUPPLEMENTAL VIEWS OF HON. LORETTA SANCHEZ
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I would also like to state for the record that for the reasons stated above, I do not support the Dellums-Weldon Amendment to H.R. 695, and would have voted against it. Loretta Sanchez.
A very pleasant flame by Rep. Sanchez. It's unlikely that her predecessor Bob Dornan would have been on our side.... Thanks! Bill Bill Stewart, stewarts@ix.netcom.com Regular Key PGP Fingerprint D454 E202 CBC8 40BF 3C85 B884 0ABE 4639
participants (3)
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Bill Stewart
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Declan McCullagh
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John Young