distributed data store, a la eternity
Ryan Lackey <rdl@mit.edu> writes:
I've been looking at the current eternity server, and it's a nice thing, but I'm kind of convinced no system like this which does not allow for electronic payments for those taking the risks will be successful. Perhaps I'm wrong, but I don't think so. It takes money to run a secure data store. (my current project depends upon secure distribued available data storage, so I've been looking into this for a while)
The eternity servers announced recently are experimental. That is to say they are designed as a vehicle for improvement. They are not completed systems yet. I am most keen myself to see eternity servers which are truly resilient; the implementation we have is a first cut. The whole idea is for it to be improved. As to the risks issue (being an eternity server operator might lead to legal hassles, and therefore people need to make money to compensate), I have three main comments on that: 1. Accepting money for activities might worsen your legal position as you are then personally offering services. This issue has been argued about in the past in relation to the idea of having for-pay remailers. I'm not legally qualified to comment on this. 2. With my design the document store is a separate distributed system which is now part of the landscape, and is well accepted as a home for all kinds of dodgy materials and discussions. People are used to the fact that some alt USENET newsgroups are full of material which is illegal in some parts of the world. If you start from scratch with a new document distribution method, your first few servers are easy targets, due to small numbers. People will be intolerant of them, and the Feds will probably go for RICO conspiracy and lock all 6 up. Game over before you start. I agree that you can do much better theoretically with this model, but you've got to consider existing network social norms, USENET is part of the landscape. You won't simultaneously manage to threaten all news admins in the world to close down alt groups, they are in too many countries, and admins will rebel, and there will be plenty left. So using USENET allows you to point the finger and say "it's not my material, it's just USENET posts". Much like altavista doesn't issue cancel messages for posts in USENET news, it's not their problem, they're just providing a view onto a distributed database. Or much like providing an open access NNTP server, or access to users only as done by thousands of ISPs the world over without ill-effect modulo localised attempts to force people to not carry some groups. Another less openly stated opinion of mine is that the way to do it is to start as I have, and add other document sharing channels later. Keep some confusion for the observer as to where the material is coming from. As long as it _might_ have come out of USENET news on the fly, you can use that as a cover argument. If the shit hits the fan you can fall back to that. Probably long term I think you would want to keep USENET as a fall back system, but definately keep it as the distribution channel (it is _the_ most secure way of delivering anonymous messages, where you want to protect the recipients identity: broadcast it). Much better than sending mail via anonymous remailers. Mixmaster is good, but not that good in the face of repeated posting by one individual of materials which seriously annoy a major government. 3. Last argument is the "good enough" argument. If the above tactic of using USENET as a distribution mechanism, and having cacheing, and optionally charging for storage, with exchange of articles between servers survives censorship in practice, why bother with anything more complex. For example Ross talks about arranging it so that documents are reconstructed from secret shares so that individual servers don't know what they've served. Well that's sexy stuff, and clearly more secure if you absolutely must conceal which server served what material, if it has definately got the material from a database which it owns. The basic threat model of my eternity server design is disposable nodes. That is it's like the new low orbit satellite systems, the satellites fall in and burn up after a while, but it doesn't matter because it's part of the design to keep throwing up new ones often enough to ensure continuous cover. Same for eternity servers. Individuals will cave, but when they do other enraged netters will start some more in protest. Just look at the Scientologist battles. It's simply amazing the bravery of the Scientologist detractors in face of types of harrasement thrown at them. Despite this the Scientologists are losing in that their materials are all over the place. This suggests to me that USENET could work just fine. Also there is the possibility of private eternity servers. That is you have an eternity server for your own use only, or only for a group of friends, or only for users of your ISP. That one won't come under attack, and provided USENET doesn't get censored you'll be ok. Perhaps pointing the finger at USENET will be an effective strategy. Perhaps we'll find out one way or another in the next few months :-) Empirical cryptography. Now some ideas on moving towards a real Anderson Eternity Service (in small stages, the first steps are far removed), I have several ideas for where to go next: a) Cache replacement policy based on number of accesses There is currently a cache of eternity documents. Documents and servers are configurable to either cache: on, off, or encrypted. One solution to the question of what happens when you fill up that 100Mb cache is to discard least accessed pages. Popular stuff stays, and you have fixed storage requirements. The mantra "Disk is cheap". It wouldn't kill someone these days to dedicate a 6Gb disk for an eternity cache. b) Have the above cache policy augmented with pay for disk space with ecash storage fee included with post. Realistically for either you need a way for eternity servers to ask each other for articles. Well they can do that easily enough via http, but you still need to know which servers are available. c) Use news archival services as another database to query. eg altavista, dejanews. I am starting to think that this is not such a hot idea now, because it's too centralised, and the operators are already hostile to bloat of their archive space, and do things like truncate UUencoded documents, and PGP ascii armored documents already. I mean ok, I'm sure we could run a war of new crude stego improvements being countered by more advanced eternity article detectors, up until we get to a natural langauge looking stego encoder. Texto is a simple example of one of these.
Would anyone else be interested in working on a real reliable distributed data store, more like what Anderson described than the current Eternity server? Specifically, something with payment systems built in,
Payment is definately going to go in. It will be necessary to control volume somehow if it gets popular, and it allows providors to cover their expenses. Charging for document download might be an idea also to cover bandwidth.
a multiplicity of ways to pass messages from server to server,
That has to come also, because of USENET expiring, and because of the non-distributed nature of systems of using the news archival services (dejanews etc). Initial ideas are: - have list of eternity servers, and query them randomly until you find one which has the document. Pro: simple solution, fast lookup, Con: has easily accessible comprehensive list of who's running eternity servers. - build something in terms of remailers to allow eternity servers to query each other anonymously. Con: _slow_ lookup. - build specialised DC-net or pipe net setup with eternity servers on it. Pro: fast lookup, harder to track who's serving what, Con: no implementations yet, con #2 provides a fat target for distrupting, take out the DC net/pipenet and the document exchange connectivity fails. - secret sharing documents over eternity servers
and a multi-level design in which a maximum amount of anonymity is preserved?
One approach would be to treat anonymity as a separable issue from the issue of hiding which server served which document (and issues of secret sharing etc). That is couldn't the viewer use crowds, or less securely www.anonymizer.com. However I think there is an opportunity to have the document constructed by the eternity server nodes in such a way that only the requester can reconstruct the document. Eg each server encrypt the share it is serving with the requesters public key. Then only the requester can recover the shares and hence the document. You should make sure it's forward secrect too.
I'm not saying I don't like the current eternity server, just that I'd like to work on one with payment systems built in,
I'm all for payment methods. Perhaps hascash (http://www.dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/hashcash/) would be a good experimental currency to get it working with first, and then switch to real anonymous ecash a bit later.
and more closely following the original idea for an eternity server (which I thought was a great one).
I'm all for making things as resilient and crypgraphically strong as you can. However I think part of the reason for different opinions is that you are addressing three issues at once: - non censorable document store - preventing people correlating material with the server which served it - making the users accesses anonymous The design of my eternity server as it is at the moment trying to address just: - non censorable document store by relying on the low orbit satellite model for public access servers, and the borrowing from the dififculty of censoring USENET news. Mild attempts can be made to protect correlation of users with material accessed: - enable ssl on the server (Cheap solution I know, as it relies on the trustworthiness of the operators of the server, and that the system hasn't been compromised by hackers, and that you have possibility of MITM attack if the servers certificate isn't authenticated, or even if it is with a more determined long term MITM attack). No attempt is made to prevent: - people correlating material with the server which served it because that is outside the design criteria. Who cares what they correlate for the server. The server is just forwarding you USENET news articles, just like an open access NNTP server, with a bit of reformatting. If someone takes enough exception to that there will be plenty of other eternity servers to take up the slack. Please feel free to take and hack the eternity-0.08 source code, and contribute, or hack it for your whatever purposes. I'd be interested in any comments on this somewhat long post from yourself, and other readers. Adam -- Have *you* exported RSA today? --> http://www.dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/rsa/ print pack"C*",split/\D+/,`echo "16iII*o\U@{$/=$z;[(pop,pop,unpack"H*",<> )]}\EsMsKsN0[lN*1lK[d2%Sa2/d0<X+d*lMLa^*lN%0]dsXx++lMlN/dsM0<J]dsJxp"|dc`
A couple of minor nits in an otherwise excellent article: Adam Back <aba@dcs.ex.ac.uk> writes:
So using USENET allows you to point the finger and say "it's not my material, it's just USENET posts". Much like altavista doesn't issue cancel messages for posts in USENET news, it's not their problem, they're just providing a view onto a distributed database.
As far as I can determine, dec's altavista does process cancels - not a good way to use Usenet these days. :-( However Dejanews doesn't process cancels.
Just look at the Scientologist battles. It's simply amazing the bravery of the Scientologist detractors in face of types of harrasement thrown at them.
{Ex-Anti-}Scientologists are scum too. If they weren't nuts, they wouldn't have joined the cult in the first place. --- Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- On Wed, 6 Aug 1997, Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM wrote: [...]
However Dejanews doesn't process cancels.
However Dejanews dose not store binaries. I do not know if there filters consider PGP ascii armor as a binarie. So Dejanews may not store the cancels. You could try and get it of a "Site of vertue" or jetcafe. - -- Please excuse my spelling as I suffer from agraphia see the url in my header. Never trust a country with more peaple then sheep. ex-net.scum and proud You Say To People "Throw Off Your Chains" And They Make New Chains For Themselves? --Terry Pratchett -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3i Charset: noconv iQCVAwUBM+igxqQK0ynCmdStAQFCOQQAlGLR9crVoAnQTPQcPlkucycvmU1DeXTC 4BQ4Fnpj8WkGstqTyh9cxdFVql8ShcCmwqF7aBISgdd/nVpIl/IX3j02N/1zYbfS pLGlAganvBJA+YMqnspJSIgk+8oLONqaIYfpZIzAGT662QY2BPtjycpSHa5heHCy bHk/E6qtAzQ= =9Uc7 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
participants (4)
-
? the Platypus {aka David Formosa} -
Adam Back -
dlv@bwalk.dm.com -
Ryan Lackey