The assertion that an Ub must be an Rb, a truly Random bit, is irrelevant ideology unless there exists the means to convert the Unknown bit, Ub, into a Known bit, Kb.

This is a plainly circular argument, what you are saying is that if a bit cannot be predicted it can be used, yet it does not have to be random. It is patently obvious to anyone with cryptographic experience and most people without any that to be unpredictable a stream of bits has to be random, otherwise if there is a correlation the next bits can be predicted from the previous bits.

That is the sublime basis of the IPG algorithm, which is to generate a stream of "unknown bits" which cannot be analytically reconstituted in the absence of the OTP generator key, and possibly other related key like parameters.

RUBBISH, yes, I know i`m shouting but I really have taken enough of this crap from snake oil peddlers over the years. IF ARITHMETIC METHODS ARE USED TO CONSTRUCT A KEY THE RESULTING CRYPTOSYSTEM IS NOT A ONE TIME PAD.... END OF STORY You cannot mathematically prove the security of the generator used in this system and are unlikely to be able to ever. whatever the case you can never prove the security of the whole system, the only provably secure system is a one time pad. It may be predictable on output, we have already shown that it is vulnerable to many other cryptanalytic attacks, including Adams chosen plaintext attack and my timing attack. The whole system has a number of gaping holes in it and no ammount of high worded twaddle is going to make it secure.

The additional caveat of course is that the key cannot be guessed, nor can it be derived from brute force methodologies, both of which are patently impossible with the IPG algorithm.

The key can probably be guessed, on first examination, which took about 5 minutes before I dismissed the algorithm as snakeoil, the generator appeared to me to be an array or linear congruential generators which have been cryptanalysed and proved insecure, by this very fact there is obviously a cryptanalytic attack waiting out there on the generator which produces no unpredictable state whatsoever in the "randomness pool"

You do not have to be a Stephen Hawking to comprehend why that is a fact; each of you, with possible minor exceptions, will be able to discern that because it quickly becomes self evident as you ply the algorithm.

No, each of us has looked at the algorithm and decided that it is insecure, we have even proved it to you mathematically, and if your math was any better than high school level you would be able to comprehend our arguments, it is abundantly clear to me that nothing, not even the words of a world class cryptographer like Blaze or Rivest would convice you that your system is insecure, you have gone about creating a cryptosystem the same old way any idiot with no experience or knowledge of cryptography does. You have made up the most hideously complicated mess of data transformations you can imagine then constructed an inverse function to recover the data. you have given no thought to any complexity theoric or intuitive proof of the security of this algorithm, just done some irrelevant statistical tests on some keystream. your hope is that no-one else will be able to untangle this mess, you are deepy wrong. Please get a clue. Datacomms Technologies web authoring and data security Paul Bradley, Paul@fatmans.demon.co.uk Paul@crypto.uk.eu.org, Paul@cryptography.uk.eu.org Http://www.cryptography.home.ml.org/ Email for PGP public key, ID: 5BBFAEB1 "Don`t forget to mount a scratch monkey"