This week's Spiegel has a three-page follow-up article on the CIA spy: Der Spiegel No. 12 / 1997, pp. 34-36. Espionage / "Dinner for Two" For almost three years, a CIA agent has pumped a Head of Unit in Bonn's Economy Ministry. The US agencies' wild actions no longer are taboo. The official Klaus Dieter von Horn, 60, ex officio is on the guard of spies - the Superior Counsellor in the Economy Ministry is responsible for the Arabian area. As the head of unit VB7 - that concentrates on Iran - knows, spies from the Near East, but also from other areas, take a keen interest in the files on his desk. Nevertheless, at first the official did not pay much attention to Geoffry Plant's efforts. After all, he was in diplomatic duty of the big brother USA. Horn and Plant got to know each other late in 1994, and the American invited the German to a dinner for two every three or four weeks. The US embassy's IInd Secretary liked to chat about his employer and kept asking even more questions about Horn's ministry. He had Horn explain the political background of the Mykonos lawsuit, and was interested in the Hermes credits to Iran. When Bonn in August 1995 asked Iran to send two employees of their office in Bonn on vacation without return tickets because they had been unveiled as spies, Plant wanted to know all details. Another time, he politely asked for a list of those firms that deliver all sorts of goods, especially high tech, to the Mullahs' state. The Ministerial Counsellor remained courteous, but refused: He was not allowed to hand over those papers, Plant surely knew that? The American did understand, but he would not give up. Last year in May, he again invited Horn to dinner. He was leaving the embassy, he said, and on farewell still handed over a Montblanc pen of almost 300 DM worth. Also, he introduced his successor: Peyton K Humphries, a diplomat working on Iran. Plant asked him not to forget that name. That was for granted. Other authorities were already awaiting the US embassy's new second secretary with large interest: The German intelligence agencies wanted to check if the Americans were willing to continue the agents game in diplomatic undercover. Because already in Summer 1995, after the first talks with Plant, wary Horn had contacted the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) and the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (BfV). Obviously, he reported, American spies were assigned to him. He correctly informed the BfV about the various meetings and also handed over presents such as pens and champagne. Then, as Humphries queried him about the ongoing construction of the nuclear power plant of Busher after his return from a trip to Teheran, Horn described the US interest in full detail. What was happening there, was a textbook case to the BfV agent hunters: Spies from a foreign power wanted to recruit a German top official. It is the spy school's ABC to first give the source test orders such as obtaining material from an open source - as in Horn's case. Also typical: The German was supposed not to talk to anyone about the encounters, including US embassy staff. Humphries: "There are two competing camps." The CIA and the embassy's economy department don't get on well with each other. After the German counterespionage experts had dropped all plans to crack the US embassy that lies at the Rhine like a fortress at Deichmanns Aue 29, or to tap Humphries' telephone, in this February BfV head Peter Frisch talked to the head of the CIA in Bonn, Floyd L Paseman. Humphries, Frisch demanded, was to leave the country, the Chancellor's Office and the Foreign Office were annoyed. Paseman denied espionage, but assured that the CIA agent would leave until May 30. He insistently asked to handle the incident most discreetly. It failed. Since Der Spiegel reported first details about the snooping last week, the relations between the goverment and Washington are not free from irritations. In the US, comparisons were made with France kicking out four CIA agents in 1995. "Why do the United States spy out their friends?" the Wall Street Journal asked. "Shame", said the Chicago Tribune's editorial. Washington still treated Germany as an agents center like "in the age of Cold War". The timid in Bonn now are afraid of trouble with the big brother. But there also is relief. Kicking the CIA man out gives the chance to no longer treat espionage among friends as a taboo. Six and a half years after re-unification and the end of the allied forces' privileges in Germany, the Germans in the conspirative area still are not the masters of their own house. Still, some Western agencies - the Americans at the head - act like in their own backyard. Hortensie I, the BND's synonym for the CIA, and Hortensie III, as the most sinister American intelligence agency, the National Security Agency (NSA) is referred to, resemble the flower of the same name: a shrublike plant with strong roots. The "friendly agencies" are increasingly active in the capital, Berlin's Secretary of State of the Interior Kuno Böse (CDU) reported in February. In mid-February, the heads of the Offices for the Protection of the Constitution met in Bad Neuenahr to "re-structure counter-intelligence". "Focussing on the East", they noted as item 4, "would not correspond to political reality any more". Looking to the West shows surprising activity: More than 1,000 wiretap technicians and 100 professional US agents bustle about in Germany, security experts estimate. 20 intelligence officers are suspected in the American embassy at the Rhine alone. The friendly power's spies are in consulates, allied supreme command, and barracks. They try to recruit agents in Germany, they tap sources without consultation, and whoever uses a telephone between the Alps and the Baltic Sea must be aware that the NSA be switched in - attention, the friend is listening. Before 1990, the American eavesdroppers were ubiquitious. They maintained a listening post on the mountain Teufelsberg in Berlin, to listen to East Berlin, and probably the West as well. In Frankfort am Main, close to the Zeil, there was another impressive listening post. In the Lech plain near Gablingen, the Americans constructed a powerful circular antenna grid - some 300 meters of diameter and 100 meters of heigth. Upside, they were listening on short wave to the Eastern generals' orders. What they were doing in the underground, has remained their secret. The Teufelsberg has been left, as the Americans moved further to the East. The Frankfort subsidiary has also been closed, and Gablingen will be given up next year. But the Americans' pride, their "giant ear" in Germany, will remain, and it makes the ordinary wiretap look rather ordinary. The site is located in Bad Aibling, Upper Bavaria. In an idyllic landscape, the empire of Hortesie III extends immensely. Gigantic antenna facilities that in their covers rise above the plain like huge gulf balls are eavesdropping Russian military. Russian sattelites are tapped, the telephone traffic directed to the formerly Soviet army is recorded. Right next to it, in the German Mangfall barrack, resides the BND's so-called long distance radio traffic site. It (object "Orion") may use the American antennae, nearly 100 eavesdroppers are analyzing the cyrillic babel of speech. But the peace is deceptive. The intelligence empire NSA (estimated budget: 3.5 billion dollar, about 100,000 employees) maintains a large complex in Bad Aibling that is terra incognita to the German agencies. By far, it is not just about the legitimate American safety interests. In the midst of Germany, there is a control center for the many American espionage sattelites that, according to a security expert in Bonn, "long since do not only spy out the East". The celestial bodies of American origin circulating in close orbit suck in electronic signals above Germany like a huge vacuum cleaner. With encrypted signals, Bad Aibling queries the memory of the satellites and searches the collected phone conversations, faxes and computer traffic for interesting stuff. Until 1995 the site officially used the name of the NSA. To keep up appearances, then a US Air Force lieutenant colonel took over command, the military flag is demonstratively fluttering in the wind. But still more than 1,000 eavesdroppers are working in the huge complex, according to BND estimates. Estimated 150 of them are directly from the NSA that does the controlling and sets the tasks. In spite of many inquiries, Hortensie III has strictly denied to exchange all information from "non-military intelligence". The BND, they argue, can offer nothing of comparable value. But it probably is more about not telling the Germans what they really do. If American and German security experts are right, European companies are systematically spied out from Bad Aibling. Years ago, US president Bill Clinton decreed American agencies to larger commitment in economic espionage. When the European airplane giant Airbus Industries, of which Germany holds 37.9%, was competing for a large Saudi Arabian contract with two US groups, the NSA intervened. It intercepted all faxes and phone conversations between Airbus and the Saudis. So, the Americans knew their opponent and their offers were unbeatable - after all the orders valued at six billion dollars. While the British and French to a certain extend respect Germany's souvereignty, the Americans, who had brought up the BND, behave like a victor power. They insist on supplementary agreements on intelligence cooperation with "the allied forces". Thus, the Germans must respect "necessities of military safety" of Nato contingents here. There is much room for secretive manners in German territory. In its "Westport" office in the East of Munich, the CIA until now maintains a so-called inquiry office. The Americans ask asylum-seeking refugees and emigrants from whom they expect informaition to come to Munich from all Germany. Pro forma, the BND is asked for endorsement, but the talks usually take place without German participation, and the BND does not learn about possible CIA recruitments. The Americans are questioning deserted Russian soldiers, war refugees from former Yugoslavia, and asylum-seekers from the Near East. The VIPs of them are offered asylum in the USA. Even applicants from overseas are brought to the experts in Munich for interrogation. For a long time, German politics have ignored the activities of the rogue agency. In autumn 1994, the Chancellor's Office installed a working group, strictly confidential of course, to get the American and other friendly agencies under control. Three ministries and three intelligence agencies were sitting at the table, headed by Rudolf Dolzer, professor of international law, at that time Head of Unit in the Chancellor's Office. "What they are doing here is not possible", Dolzer got exited. "They must comply with law and oder." The group boldly planned to prohibit the Americans from interrogating asylum-seekers without German participation, in Bad Aibling BND specialists should watch the NSA, recruiting sources should be prohibited. After all - they concluded - espionage activities also from friendly states are not politically protected. In 1995, their will of protection suddenly vanished. Distances between meetings grew longer, finally the Chancellor's Office didn't send out invitations any more. Above all, the BfV that already had created lists with names of suspicious agents was disappointed. "Someone on the very top must have pulled the plug", someone from an intelligence agency says. It is dubious if the case of CIA agent Humphries will cause with the Americans to change their policy. At least, friendship with America means a big deal to Helmut Kohl who does not consider the intelligence business especially important. The Chancellor is not even scared by the sinister NSA. He does have telephones that are guaranteed to be wiretap-proof. Even when he is on vacation at the Wolfgangsee [in Austria], the BND always installs a device which not even the NSA can crack. But the secure devices have one important drawback: First the partner has to stop speaking before you can speak yourself. That is why the Chancellor to the displeasure of the security people prefers the old telephone - a friend trusts a friend. [End] Thanks to anonymous. For earlier reports on US spying in Germany: http://jya.com/despon.txt http://jya.com/ciaami.txt http://jya.com/really.txt