Transmission Management
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Lucky Green wrote:
And PGP's Policy Enforcer has another side to it: have you ever forgotten to encrypt email that should have been encrypted? I have. With the Policy Enforcer installed, that can't happen. Which may well save big hassles in the future.
(This feature is independent of the GAK aspects of the product.) It's probably a good idea to set up your mailer so that it discourages transmission of unencrypted mail. This could be as simple as a sequence of questions: "Do you want to do this?", "Do you really want to do this?", and "Are you absolutely one hundred percent sure that it is a good idea to put this message on tape at Fort Meade for eternity?" But, you could make more amusing warnings. For example, the mailer could convert your message into a front page article for the New York Times and show you what it will look like. Agencies which handle encrypted communications typically track every message sent. We should do the same thing. Most people probably do this in an informal way, but really slick tools for doing this would have their uses. This is especially true when managing an identity. Not only would it be nice to track every transmission in a nice easy to assess way, but also track exactly how it was transmitted, the precise time of transmission, and the remailers used to deliver it. This raw information would be neat to have, but it wouldn't get really useful without an analysis tool. For instance, you could see how much your identity depends on the security of certain remailers. If you use one remailer in your chains a lot, you might want to have something which warns you that you are becoming overly dependent on that remailer. Or, you might want to run "what if" scenarios to see if you would be vulnerable if a particular set of remailers were compromised. If the analysis tool were really good, it would hunt for weaknesses based on known remailer attacks. And, naturally, for proper identity management it would be important to keep a running score for the odds that each identity were compromised and by which threats. Monty Cantsin Editor in Chief Smile Magazine http://www.neoism.org/squares/smile_index.html http://www.neoism.org/squares/cantsin_10.html -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBNDh0V5aWtjSmRH/5AQFyFwf+OhIbig7B/njU1yTlDdIuBHs3jpYyH6Ol /+Cjk9X2MbFkYGec3vm8muf1alGI/8ZH+NV73cXry1rN8FqdIY/eoJX5OoRhTQpa ajQFNnSaufbY2xgx45o7S+jFCFGaasInjsvl7q78iH8JL2seXgG3t7HNsK/SZOqD lZynyUqCaVssiSTkDHiZx72TUPJbhUCOvkoKdiy5evQlN7PPyKNmajB9INbzin7z qKqfyyHyFR+Gu618IojassyZ9wuEzbjMStTRMf8TGOo8yJWaH0+W7KX9JHVF3Zdv EjINSw7EBxMAOk83AY9YP0nuLJnwaEoloKifX6D+MmQ+Jx9Js2ocuA== =HUZ7 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
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nobody@REPLAY.COM