Re: Latency, bandwidth, and anonymity
In the longer term, anonymous communication is in danger of being used only by fringe groups if it falls too much behind the non-anonymous kind in terms of latency and bandwidth (and cost, I guess). Maybe ONLY drug dealers, nuclear terrorists, etc., will use anonymous remailers when full sensory virtual interaction is the must popular way for most people to communicate and remailers are still the only choice for the anonymity-conscious.
My initial reaction to "Anonymous video conferencing" was "That's when you wear black ski masks and use voice scramblers and call from video payphones", i.e. not very useful. ("Subcomandata Marcos here...") On the other hand, Wei Dai's followup message about puts a different spin on it. It's a real problem, if not now, then maybe in 5-10 years. I realize that those of us in the Phone Company who have predicted universal Picturephone in the past have been over-optimistic :-), but the video compression people and the faster-chip people keep bringing us closer to having good-quality low-bandwidth video, and ISDN and fast modems are bringing available loop-end bandwidth up to the point that reasonably-priced circuits can carry it. (Long-haul raw bits have been cheap enough for a while; it's the distribution and switching technology that have a lot of the cost, and providing cheap high-bandwidth circuits makes it hard to make money on voice calls.) The approaches to anonymous video conferencing will depend a bit on whether the technology takes off on the nets or the phone system, if those two are still different by then. It's easier to obscure the origins of a call on the nets, where users own large parts, than it is on the phone system, where the Phone Companies own and operate most of it; the latter environment would require Phone Remailers, such as PBXs you call into on T1 lines and get shuffled out on other circuits - it's hard to get adequate mixing except in rather large environments.... Recircuiting on the nets will be left as an excercise to the reader. I suspect the harder parts of the job may be doing the faces and voices right - anonymous voice conference bridges are ok if the participants mostly don't know each other, but they're less useful if people know each other and cops with computerized voiceprint equipment may be eavesdropping (not common now, though computers and models of the human voice are improving; I suppose voice disguisers may improve from the kid's-toy quality to something better if there's a market, or if computers with full-duplex soundcards become more common.) Faces are harder, and they're not really a crypto problem - how do you fake them well? It's not too hard to do a "quayletool" quality solution that generates moving lips in front of a static picture, even timed with an audio feed, but that won't play too well in the business world, and having the camera pointing at your calendar or home page is only semi-useful. If video-calling evolves on the nets, there'll be a lot more need for speed-matching services, and it may be that computer-enhanced video receiving for high-bandwidth users will fund the technology development for face-simulation? If so, maybe you can use it to start with fake stills instead of real ones? Bill
On Sun, 8 Jan 1995 wcs@anchor.ho.att.com wrote:
My initial reaction to "Anonymous video conferencing" was "That's when you wear black ski masks and use voice scramblers and call from video payphones", i.e. not very useful. ("Subcomandata Marcos here...")
Video conferencing was just ONE of the applications of high-bandwidth, low-latency anonymous communication. Maybe it was a bad example. Here's a couple more: 1. anonymous distributed computing: suppose Alice wants to help Bob crack a secret key by using both of their computers, but the algorithm entails some heavy exchange of data between them 2. anonymous remote consulting: Alice is building a nuclear bomb and needs help, so she sends a live video feed of her workshop to Bob (and have the computer blot out her face in real time). Bob sends Alice an audio only commentary of what Alice is doing wrong. We tend to focus on the more exotic applications of these tools, but as mjk pointed out they will have perfectly ordinary uses by people who simply don't want everyone in the world to be able to know everything about them. Maybe Alice just wants to call AT&T to ask about their Clipper phone, and not have everybody realize that and send her a bunch of propaganda about Voice PGP. :-) Even now, this may not be as implausible as it sounds. What if Alice is using MCI as the long distance carrier, and MCI happens to be selling Voice PGP? Wei Dai
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- In article <9501090353.AA13655@anchor.ho.att.com>, wcs@anchor.ho.att.com (bill.stewart@pleasantonca.ncr.com +1-510-484-6204) wrote:
My initial reaction to "Anonymous video conferencing" was "That's when you wear black ski masks and use voice scramblers and call from video payphones", i.e. not very useful. ("Subcomandata Marcos here...")
I thought so too, at first; but then I thought of this obvious application: The scene is a bare room, with a single chair in the middle. Seated on the chair is THE VICTIM, whose head covered in a hood. The victim's hands are bound to the armrests, and the legs to those of the chair. A KIDNAPPER enters the scene and walks over to the victim. The kidnapper's face is obscured, either by a hood or ski mask, or by digital scrambling of the image. The kidnapper's voice is scrambled digitally. The kidnapper pulls the hood off of the victim's head, and speaks. KIDNAPPER: Okay, you're on! Talk! The camera slowly zooms in on the victim's face. VICTIM (tentatively): Mom? Dad? It's me. DAD (voice over): Is that really you, son? Are you all right? VICTIM: It's me. I'm okay. This is no picnic, but they're treating me okay, considering. Listen, have a message they want you to pass on to the President. DAD: I don't know if I can get it to him. It's not like we play golf together. VICTIM (nervously): You have to. You'll find away. Tell the President that he has to pull the troops out of Belgrade. If the U.S. forces aren't pulled completely out by the end of this month, they say they're going to cut me into pieces and send them to you piece piece. . . . etc. Whether technology is going to be developed for the convenience of kidnappers and terrorists is an open question. But there is clearly at least this one clear use for anonymous video conferencing. There are probably more. | PROOF-READER, n: A malefactor who atones for Alan Bostick | making your writing nonsense by permitting abostick@netcom.com | the compositor to make it unintelligible. finger for PGP public key | Ambrose Bierce, THE DEVIL'S DICTIONARY Key fingerprint: | 50 22 FB 46 41 A3 17 9D F7 33 FF E1 4E 1C 89 79 +legal_kludge=off -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.1 iQB1AgUBLxG1reVevBgtmhnpAQH+jwL/cAzxwneTG6Wl7H9VCasFBH8X4daM8NUx ORKp06DYybTv45h2baQtINvpDceD4nHt3OThvIEMVg6FCGNq2fBolZHOqTwYP1K6 66QNxEjlyKiQ5dkNKPlwgabFZ6pR0H5y =sbqg -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
participants (3)
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abostick@netcom.com -
wcs@anchor.ho.att.com -
Wei Dai