Probabilistic Encryption
How secure do you guys think Probabilistic encryption using a BBS generator is? It looks like its every bit as good for key exchanges as RSA and somewhat better because of its speed. Would I compromise the security of the algorithm if I modified it to take the maximum number of random bits from each itteration of the BBS RNG and made the corrosponding changes in the encryption algorithm this making it faster? How dangerous is it (looking at system wide security) to generate the random bits ahead of time? Is it overkill to disable swaping from the location the random bits are held in? (keeping in mind that disabling swapping is a major pain since it is system specific). Thanks, JWS
solman@mit.edu says:
How secure do you guys think Probabilistic encryption using a BBS generator is? It looks like its every bit as good for key exchanges as RSA and somewhat better because of its speed.
The technique you mention is not one I've heard of. What is a BBS generator? Could you please explain? Perry
solman@mit.edu says:
How secure do you guys think Probabilistic encryption using a BBS generator is? It looks like its every bit as good for key exchanges as RSA and somewhat better because of its speed.
The technique you mention is not one I've heard of. What is a BBS generator? Could you please explain?
Perry
Blum-Blum-Shub, a very strong random number generator, where guessing the next bit is basically as hard as factoring some very large number. It's main problem is that it's slow. Schneier has some actual code for implementing it in C. --Tim May -- .......................................................................... Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay@netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^859433 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."
participants (3)
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Perry E. Metzger -
solman＠MIT.EDU -
tcmay＠netcom.com