At 3:36 PM 5/28/96, E. ALLEN SMITH wrote:
From: IN%"matts@pi.se" "Matts Kallioniemi" 28-MAY-1996 06:08:28.40
Why would anyone set up a remailer at Lance's (or Sameer's) machine? They have remailers running already. If the thugs break root and obtain one remailer key from a machine, they probably get all the keys on that machine, compromising all the remailers in one single attack. Or am I missing something? Is there any benefit of multiple remailers on a machine where root is running his own remailer?
Well, the advantages are: A. I get Lance's help more quickly in setting up this one, so I can later go to other machines (preferably out of the country) and set things up the same way there (getting Mixmaster from an out-of-US source, of course); and B. supporting the efforts of Sameer, Lance, et al by paying them some money. While multiple ISPs are certainly preferable (to avoid one rubber-hose (e.g., law enforcement) breaking from getting everything), your argument assumes that all the machines at a given ISP are linked together such that if one is broken, the rest are - which isn't very good from a security standpoint, so I'd hope it _isn't_ the case.
Thanks, -Allen
In addition, it is more remailers which need to be shut down to bring the remailer system down. At this point I think we need to think of robustness against shutdowns in our threat models, in addition to the usual considerations of traffic analysis. With all the shutdowns, the most immediate need is for more remailers. -Lance ---------------------------------------------------------- Lance Cottrell loki@obscura.com PGP 2.6 key available by finger or server. Mixmaster, the next generation remailer, is now available! http://www.obscura.com/~loki/Welcome.html or FTP to obscura.com "Love is a snowmobile racing across the tundra. Suddenly it flips over, pinning you underneath. At night the ice weasels come." --Nietzsche ----------------------------------------------------------