-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
From: Hal <hfinney@shell.portal.com>
I know that the Eurocrypt 89 proceedings had some articles on cryptanalyzing Chaum's mixes. My library has an excellent crypto selection but is missing this volume. Can anyone who has read this say whether there is anything in those papers that isn't obvious?
I found a copy of these proceedings in the library today. There is a paper titled "How to break the direct RSA-implementation of MIXes" by Birgit Pfitzmann and Andreas Pfitzmann. Here is its abstract: MIXes are a means of untraceable communication based on a public key cryptosystem as published by David Chaum in 1981 (CACM 24/2 84-88). In the case where RSA is used as this cryptosystem directly i.e. without composition with other functions (e.g. destroying the multiplicative structure) we show how the resulting MIXes can be broken by an active attack which is perfectly feasible in a typical MIX-environment. The attack does not affect the idea of MIXes as a whole: if the security requirements of [Chaum's paper] are concretized suitably and if a cryptosystem fulfills them one can implement secure MIXes directly. However it shows that present security notions for public key cryptosystems, which do not allow active attacks do not suffice for a cryptosystem which is used to implement MIXes directly. We also warn of the same attack and others on further possible implementations of MIXes and we mention several implementations which are not broken by any attack we know. My interpretation is that PGP-based remailers are not susceptible to the attack described by this paper. (Of course, they are currently vulnerable to much more trivial ones.) Wei Dai -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBLyMeCTl0sXKgdnV5AQFoggP/XzBFSyChFgNMrX3gCQSNfOiwHrAEKgpD a0TGYX9KBRqRd6cdDIdauDzFtPST1XjU/1RpYvlGjKIhOSd60JZwO+7185SJGBM9 q/4cqE/hOiHzB2gaoHiQFySDIkfFTeJdlIiTiS/OjbR5awkMCF+zU8cxPrgWTrxr /sM1C39O8Cc= =J20K -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----