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I don't think "disingenuous" as very apt description. For one thing, my proposal certainly doesn't make things any _worse_ for the true remailers.
Sorry if I was unclear; I didn't mean that you were being disingenuous, just that the assignment of responsibility/culpability in at least some of the schemes being discussed looks suspect to me. I do think that this plan can create greater risk for the owners of machines which operate remailers - what if one of their customers decides not to block traffic to whitehouse.gov, or to alt.religion.copyright, or whatever? Neither the SPA nor the Secret Service has acted particularly cluefully with respect to seizing hardware or conducting unnanounced destructive "fishing" expeditions. As things stand today, I have some control (via my filter list) of the risks I'm willing to assume and not assume. If I let people with no real stake in the matter gamble with my machine based on their own choices about filtering, that looks like a loss to me. (Of course, the machine owner can always, via contract, set certain terms - e.g., addresses which must be filtered. This starts to look like active participation in the administration of the remailer, which makes the off-site operator structure seem less legitimate.) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBLyCGan3YhjZY3fMNAQFpbwQAj/PSC5e2IxCpuxaLMXi/vX2DsJp6q8x0 LzKrI57AjujC07o7vHGHlhPZIgWC7hTgNxAy3wRNOqRDwb7FdX6GQfMM4aWmbU4U 1pypD5eipO3CgkaHm5VqpKnVdDmxFQ3r6tDY1qV8jV0ghnku9DpmHhQIr4C+U1Cx krBo2FThMRo= =qguX -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----