We have scanned several of the handouts at the NIST Key Escrow Issues Meeting of September 6 (not present Sept 7). Perhaps someone, Pat Farrell or another, would be willing to make them available on a homepage or ftp site. If so we will send them over. If nobody volunteers we will send them by our puny e-mail contraption. Here's what we have ready to send: 1. The outlines of meeting topics of Raymond Kammer of NIST and Michael Nelson of the White House. (7kb) 2. Discussion Paper No. 4, "Example Potential Solutions for the Draft Export Criteria for Software Key Escrow Encryption," which offers example solutions for each of the ten criteria. (7kb) 3. The Business Software Alliance's dissenting blast at the government's key escrow proposal and export limit. This paper was loudly applauded. (19kb) 4. Trusted Informations Systems's "Thoughts on the NIST Escrow Issues Meeting Discussion Papers." (27kb in 2 parts) 5. TECSEC Incorporated's "Private Escrow Key Management: A Method and its Issues." (13kb) 6. Dorothy Denning's "Comments on Draft Criteria for Software Key Escrow Exportability" and "Comments on Issues for Key Escrow Agents." (8kb) Two other papers will be scanned later: 7. National Semiconductor's "Commercial Cryptography Ideas for Success" (9 pp. of large type) This contains graphics of the CAKE program and a "Proposed NIST Escrow Certificate Heirarchy" which cannot be easily distributed by us, so we offer this by fax. 8. TECSEC's "The Merger of Technology and Cryptographic Key Management" (6 pp.). Note 1: It was Michael Nelson of the White House who said that the reason to maintain the 64-bit limit for export was because the key escrow methodology had not yet been proven reliable and that the security agencies insisted on the relatively weak system in case key escrow failed. Note 2: At the B-2 breakout session there was strong debate on a proposal for a "Criteria Zero": Before addressing any of the details of Criteria 3, 4 and 9 as presented to us, Group B-2 registers its view that export under general license of strong encryption should not require key escrow. A vote on the proposal was 7 yes, 7 no and 13 absentions. It was not reported to the plenary session.