BEGIN IBM LOTUS'S GAK'ED MESSAGE-- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Two Bits: frantz@netcom.com (Bill Frantz)
One other small advantage I can see to using Lotus's crippled encryption. It disguises the fact that a message is actually (double) encrypted with PGP. Attackers have to break the 40 bits before they see the PGP encrypted data. A pecular kind of steganography. (If you leave off the PGP header and trailer, it may be hard to determine which 40 bits are the correct key.)
Excellent point Bill! Lets not forget that IBM owns Lotus Notes, be sure to include that in your bashing. They caved in on Lucifer after all. ;) Four Bits: On First Virtuals Sniffer program: Stick a VISA,MASTERCARD,DISCOVER, or AMERICAN EXPRESS sticker on the front of a SECURE_ID card Attack>null ( Security Dynamics is SDTI on NASDAQ ;) ) Six Bits: _TAKEDOWN_ by Tsutomu Shimomura confirms that Kevin Mitnick used PGP extensively, and encrypted his drives, expect the TLA's to use that in their arguments. (Head them off at the Pass!) A Dollar: For those who seem to have missed it. "Vladimir Z. Nuri" <vznuri@netcom.com> = Larry Detweiler Back to our regular Flamefest...... Brian -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMQ5nd3sfmVh/uI7xAQFr7AQAjvjOZUEEJKdDmcVVWYFs/L20R3BIJYLC RhAOAyCh40GGiYzzvB8kHTGnu/iSE9cIp7AP2ifUHf1C9aL2TAQWuwxTROPMCwpX hSHN+UpJ5Au3YrNGZkMDPDVsGUM5EsWaaWJ2uczG330e3mZR6tBNU/BhfdS58RZy bLULdZno3nI= =kccs -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- END IBM LOTUS'S GAK'ED MESSAGE----