At 01:01 PM 9/29/95 S, Andrew Roos <AndrewR@beetle.vironix.co.za> wrote:
(This is a repeat because I posted the original 36 hours ago and it still hasn't bounced back to me.) Hmmm - I got it yesterday, so it did go out.
The attack is based on two particularly interesting three-byte key prefixes which have a high probability of producing PRNG sequences which start with a known two-byte sequence. The prefixes are: 1. Keys starting with "00 00 FD" which have a 14% probability of generating sequences which start "00 00". 2. Keys starting with "03 FD FC" which have a 5% probability of generating sequences which start "FF 03". [much interesting work deleted]
It sounds like any application using RC4 with random session keys should start by testing session keys and rejecting any that start with 00 00 or 03 FD; it means doing 2**-15 more random key generations, and reducing the brute-force space by 2**-15, but it's a pretty small reduction. #--- # Bill Stewart, Freelance Information Architect, stewarts@ix.netcom.com # Phone +1-510-247-0664 Pager/Voicemail 1-408-787-1281 #---