On Fri, 4 Aug 1995, Enzo Michelangeli wrote:
On Fri, 4 Aug 1995, Alex Tang wrote: Perry Metzger and Mark Chen have recently expressed some criticism, and Adam Shostack, around the end of May, posted a review that hilighted a number of potential problem areas.
Do you have a copy of this?
Personally, I especially dislike the use of RC4-40 (yes, other algorithms are supported, but not using the export version of Netscape Navigator); Totaly agree, hell, I going to give the option for users and server to specify at run time which ciphers never to use :-).
the excessively large portion of the handshaking data exchanged as cleartext; and the limitations in certificate management (no provisions for verifying the revocation status with a CA).
The clear text I don't like, I agree. But then when used for http, everything begins with a GET anyway. The CRL verification is again to me a matter of implementation. Currently my library does not support CRL (but I can load and manipulate them). It is simply a function of the infrastructure to go with the library. SSL v3 of the spec does alow for CRL to be passed along with the certificate heigherachy (a PKCS-7 object). I'm mostly concered with any objections raised with the protocol, not the particular implementation around right now. With my library I fully intend to make it possible to refuse to authenticate the server unless a current CRL is present. Anyway, I'm intersted in hearing people complains so I can attempt to make sure none of the fixable problems are in my library :-) eric -- Eric Young | Signature removed since it was generating AARNet: eay@mincom.oz.au | more followups that the message contents :-)