Bet you 10-1 that "Computer Network" as implemented in the new bill will refer to any computing system that could possibly defend /itself/ through common carrier status. IE including small non-networked fringe BBSs that attempt to claim "common carrier" status. And many networks that don't claim common carrier status, too. The real solution to the crypto-legalization problem is anonymity. Seeing as I've not checked the bill out yet, nor am I a lawyer, I can't say what the implications for that are. If there are anti-remailer implications, the solution may be to build tools with "security flaws" (ie remailing capability). I know that this has been discussed before, but this is the time to implement it. Obviously, the information about the "security holes" will have to be spread widely, but the flaws will have to be built so deep in the design as to not be removable. In addition, now is the time to deploy stego, on a massive scale. How many stego programs have been released for Unix? Can these be integrated with mailing programs in the same way that PGP has been? What would be the legal liability of the maintainer of a common-carrier status system that had a guest account which had been (or based on the current legislation) could be used for anonymity/crypto stuff? If he's liable, does this mean that system administrators are liable for any potential security hole in their system that a random evil internet hacker uses to abuse another system? Hmmm... Usenet alt.binaries.pictures.barney + stego software + unmaintained 'guest' account on a random system = ??? Any lawyers? Jon ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Jon Lasser <jlasser@rwd.goucher.edu> (410) 494-3253 Visit my home page at http://www.goucher.edu/~jlasser/ You have a friend at the NSA: Big Brother is watching. Finger for PGP key.