jbass@dmsd.com writes:
client -> filter Client sends packet with K(c) filter -> Server filter forwards packet with K(f) filter <- Server Server sends encrypts with K(f) client <- filter filter re-encrypts with K(c)
As the protocol progresses the filter also uses the master key, and follows the renegotiation as the master key expires.
Yeah, but in order for this to work, the fake server needs to know netscape.com's private (secret) key, no?
-jon
No ... the public part of any server private key is held by the filter and not returned to the client. The client only encrypts with public keys provided by the filter. The Server only encrypts with public keys provided by the filter. The filter has cleartext of the entire session.
What you have described is the classic 'man in the middle' attack. Netscape claims that SSL V.3 is immune to the MITM attack in appendix D.4 of the SSL V.3 spec. You will need to get the 'filter' (MITM) key signed by Verisign. Or hack Verisign's server-key-signing key. BTW your 'offer' is silly- this is not a trivial amount of work, and you would not deserve any credit for coming up with so ordinary an attack. Write the code yourself, or pay the market rate for it. -- Eric Murray ericm@lne.com ericm@motorcycle.com http://www.lne.com/ericm PGP keyid:E03F65E5 fingerprint:50 B0 A2 4C 7D 86 FC 03 92 E8 AC E6 7E 27 29 AF