On Sat, 25 May 1996, jim bell wrote:
At 12:10 AM 5/25/96 EDT, E. ALLEN SMITH wrote:
From: IN%"unicorn@schloss.li" "Black Unicorn" 24-MAY-1996 22:52:03.64
Why the first in chain? If the anti-traffic-analysis provisions are working properly, it should be impossible to prove that a given first remailer was the first remailer for any particular message. I had thought that even civil courts required that you be the person who committed some act, not the person who _might_ have committed some act. Otherwise, all the remailers are in danger. This is even if someone tries an entrapment by sending through some illegal material - if the courts accept that they should be allowed to do this, then all the remailers they chained are going to be hit.
Likewise, I don't see why the first address in the chain is vulnerable, as long as the message subsequently passes through at least one trustworthy remailer, and probably a temporary output address.
I repeat, all it takes is one person to send through only one remailer (perhaps even a Co$ plant) and the first in chain remailer is toasted. Think before you type please.
Jim Bell jimbell@pacifier.com
--- My preferred and soon to be permanent e-mail address:unicorn@schloss.li "In fact, had Bancroft not existed, potestas scientiae in usu est Franklin might have had to invent him." in nihilum nil posse reverti 00B9289C28DC0E55 E16D5378B81E1C96 - Finger for Current Key Information Opp. Counsel: For all your expert testimony needs: jimbell@pacifier.com