NOTICE: This is the letter from the Digital Privacy and Security Working Group sent to the White House 12/06/93, urging the Administration to lift export controls on DES, RSA and other mass market encryption without requring legislation. Some erroneous press reports have said the DPSWG (see letter signatories) were making a Clipper/Skipjack "deal". This is not true. The letter makes it clear that Clipper as originally proposed is not viable, and that in any form it is to be implemented only if it's use is completely voluntary and ONLY if current restrictions on mass market encryption software are removed, so that the right to choose one's own methods of privacy and security is retained, and American businesses can effectively and openly compete in the expanding international market for encryption products. For more details please see the third paragraph of the letter, below. - ----------------------------------------------------------------------- DIGITAL PRIVACY AND SECURITY WORKING GROUP 1001 G Street, NW Suite 950 East Washington, DC 20001 Jerry Berman 202/347-5400 Leah Gurowitz 202/393-1010 December 6, 1993 The President The White House Washington, DC 20500 Dear Mr. President: On April 16, 1993, you initiated a broad industry/government review of privacy and cryptography policies at the same time that the Administration unveiled its Clipper Chip proposal. The Digital Privacy and Security Working Group -- a coalition of over 50 communications and computer companies and associations, and consumer and privacy advocates -- has been working with members of your Administration to develop policies which will reflect the realities of the digital information age, the need to provide individuals at work and home with information security and privacy, and the importance of preserving American competitiveness. The Digital Privacy and Security Working Group is committed to the proposition that computer users worldwide should be able to choose their encryption programs and products, and that American programs and products should be allowed to compete in the world marketplace. In our discussions with Administration officials, we have expressed the Coalition's tentative acceptance of the Clipper Chip's encryption scheme (as announced on April 16, 1993), but only if it is available as a voluntary alternative to widely-available, commercially-accepted, encryption programs and products. Thus, we applaud repeated statements by Administration officials that there is no intent to make the Clipper Chip mandatory. One key indication of whether the choice of encryption regimes will be truly voluntary, however, is the ability of American companies to export computer programs and products employing other strong encryption algorithms (e.g. DES and RC2/RC4 at comparable strengths) demanded by customers worldwide. In this regard, we commend to your attention legislation introduced by Rep. Maria Cantwell (H.R. 3627) that would liberalize existing export controls on software with encryption capabilities. Of course, such legislation would not be necessary if the Administration acts to accomplish such export control liberalization on its own. As part of your on-going encryption review and decision-making, we strongly urge you to do so. As your Administration concludes its review of this issue, representatives of the Digital Privacy and Security Working Group remain available to meet with Administration officials at any time. Sincerely, American Civil Liberties Union IBM Apple Computer, Inc. Information Industry Association Business Software Alliance Information Technology Association of America Committee on Communications and Information Policy, IEEE-USA Iris Associates, Inc. Computer and Business Equipment Lotus Development Corporation Manufacturers Association Microsoft Corporation Crest Industries, Inc. Oracle Corporation Digital Equipment Corporation Prodigy Services Company EDUCOM Software Publishers Association Electronic Frontier Foundation Sun Microsystems, Inc. Electronic Messaging Association Telecommunications Industry Association GKI Cryptek Division Trusted Information Systems Hewlett-Packard Company cc: John Podesta, Office of the President George Tenet, National Security Council Mike Nelson, Office of Science and Technology Policy Ray Kammer, National Institute of Standards and Technology Steve Aoki, National Security Council Geoff Greiveldinger, Department of Justice - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- This document and others on related topics are archived at ftp.eff.org, ~ftp/pub/eff/crypto-policy.