From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May) Date: Sun, 2 Oct 1994 20:31:13 -0700 (PDT)
And I think we have indeed seen things coming before a lot of others did. The latest such alert, by Carl Ellison, myself, and others, is about "software key escrow," or what Carl dubs "GAK" (government access to keys). I think SKE is the wave of future repression, worth starting to fight now. The popular media is largely oblivious to it, as usual. (John Markoff, of the NY Times, is on top of it, more so than most of us, and is waiting for the right time to do something on this.)
From inside this morass, there are so many options with so many gradations
As someone at TIS actively involved in looking at SKE and related technology, I find it bothersome that Tim keeps mixing the terms SKE and GAK. I'm not a fan of giving government access to civilian keys, no matter what form it takes. However, my mother was an English major and she taught me to be protective of the language. escrow - n - a deed, a bond, money or a piece of property held in trust by a third party to be turned over to the grantee only upon the fulfillment of a condition that it's important to keep terms well defined and separate. Try this: KE: key escrow, implementation and grantee unspecified HKE: key escrow, in hardware, grantee unspecified SKE: key escrow, in software, grantee unspecified KEG: key escrow, implementation unspecified, government grantee GAK: government access to keys, method unspecified GAK is clearly more general than KE and even more general than SKE. There is a real danger that (KE/HKE/SKE) could be subverted by the government but there are some real uses (as have been pointed out here) for what Steve Walker (the TIS president) calls a "spare key in the wallet". [I'm hoping to get his paper on the subject on our FTP or Web server -- will tell people when it's there.] A spare key version of SKE would have the key's owner as grantee -- leaving the gov't out of the loop *except through normal subpoena and search warrant access*. My predictions: 1. access by subpoena is still too objectionable for many people and isn't likely to fly; 2. surveillance agencies are not served by these mechanisms so they are not likely to welcome such systems. Meanwhile, NSA access isn't covered by any of these terms, except perhaps GAK. This is relevant since at the last KEA meeting (NIST's "Key Escrow Approaches"), TIS SKE was demonstrated and people from industry were asked if they wanted to participate in an experiment -- put it in some product, let some gov't agency be the guinea pig user community and see if the FBI was happy with the result (this would be SKEG -- SKE with gov't as grantee) -- and the response was that there was *no* interest unless this provided a way to get software exported. Mike Nelson of the White House (their point man on Clipper, etc.) and Clint Brooks of NSA replied with a resounding "we'll have to think about that". [There has been no result of such thinking yet.] The sequence of events is: 1. industry wants to export 2. NSA controls export 3. industry appears ready to do all sorts of things (like provide GAK) in order to get export permission 4. the NSA doesn't get its needs met by SKEG (because the SKEG mechanisms can be circumvented, leaving normal S/W without GAK) 5. the current situation is an impasse 6. the forces of the dark side are so desperate to get GAK that they'll look at anything which might get them there ------- So, there's a real reason to watch SKEG developments. There's also a real reason to get a new Cantwell bill passed. At the same time, although the term KE is tainted by NIST/NSA/FBI misuse, there do exist positive uses for KE (especially SKE) *without* the gov't as grantee. I encourage individuals to give this a little thought. The example Steve Walker keeps using in public is "the second time I locked myself out of my car, I decided to carry a spare key in my wallet". [...]
Dorothy Denning is deeply involved with SKE,
Dorothy has seen the TIS SKE demo. Involvement other than that is none, at least on TIS's side, except that she provided one suggestion to the three TIS developers (Dave Balenson, Steve Lipner and Steve Walker) during the design stage (in early May I believe). BTW, my name appears on the TIS SKE paper because I added a variant -- the escrow-less option. That is, instead of having a private key in escrow for the FBI to get and use forever, have the sender split his session key into KS1 and KS2 (KS = XOR(KS1,KS2)) and encrypt each half for a different escrow agent. [That term is already a misnomer in this case, since these "escrow agents" have no databases of keys and therefore escrow nothing. I tell you, this morass has done major damage to the English language, all because the gov't perpetrators are afraid to say what they really mean, in plain English!] LE would then have to send a piece to each escrow agent for each message -- letting the agents do traffic analysis on FBI efforts and also giving out no key lasting beyond a wiretap court order. As with anything else, when faced with a technical problem, if I see solutions I offer them. [PRZ tells a story of an engineer being led to a gallows which has been malfunctioning, letting people go free (through a presumed act of God) -- looking at it and saying "Oh, I see the problem". (sorry if I ruined the joke with abbreviation)] ob.polit.: I don't mind GAK if it is applied only to the military and various executive agencies, as Clipper/Capstone now appears to be. Those people have already given up rights to private communications. However, for military uses of Capstone, it bothers me as a citizen to see the keys kept by Treasury and NIST. I'd rather see them kept by NSA and Fort Knox (and I've said so, to Mike Nelson among others). For private citizens, I intend to fight to my last breath any attempt to declare a government right to our keys. I also intend to fight attempts to declare that the public is volunteering to go along with GAK. I don't buy that and I'm in a position to see if it were true.
working with Miles Schmid of the NSA
Miles is with NIST (or was this a snide comment on NIST? :-).
and the folks from Trusted Information Systems (according to Whit Diffie, who saw a joint presentation by the bunch of them in Karlsruhe, and their glee that the Micali escrow patent will likely be overturned due to prior art in Europe).
The TIS SKE stuff was presented at several places, most recently the CSS&PAB. The new thrust by Steve Walker is that the public has no reason to buy KEG products. They add no value to the consumer. However, the public *has* a reason to buy spare-key-in-the-wallet systems. Given the existence of a redundant place to find a message key (or to get it decrypted), law enforcement could mine that database, using existing legal mechanisms (subpoena and search warrant). [This access does not meet the desires of covert surveillance, however, so it's likely to be rejected.] - Carl