On Sun, 15 Oct 1995 s1018954@aix2.uottawa.ca wrote:
On Sun, 15 Oct 1995, Black Unicorn wrote:
Effectively the potential for misuse is increased by virtue of the increased numbers of officals (commercial and public) who have access to the material.
Does he mean mandatory commercial key escrow (as in clipper keys held by credit agencies?) Or something totally voluntary but standardized by the gov?
The problem exists in both these examples.
Of course it all depends on exactly why they really want the escrow anyway. If people will encrypt a second time with tomorrow's pgp, why should anyone care?
When you see a glaring hole in argument for a government program, you should smell the stench of fish in the air. That is the section of the puzzle that is being hidden until a politically "ripe" time to stick it in place. Here that piece is, obviously, banning tomorrow's pgp.
All you'd single encrypt for would be your income tax and the financial records you're already required by law to keep (I'm sure I've misunderstood this. Can't be so useless.). I know that's not a particularily diplomatic carry-over from the debated-to-death clipper thing, but really, except as PR, why DO they still take this seriously? (unless you want to be paranoid about a ban, hmm, nevermind, debated-to-death)
I'm not so sure it's paranoid. You have trial baloons floating all over. Freeh is a prime example, and no one is screaming loudly enough to shoot down his blump. That's a big'ole green light for regulators.> --- "In fact, had Bancroft not existed, potestas scientiae in usu est Franklin might have had to invent him." in nihilum nil posse reverti 00B9289C28DC0E55 E16D5378B81E1C96 - Finger for Current Key Information