! Yes, subject says it all. anon.penet.fi was a whole lot worse than ! cypherpunks remailers. It provided clueless users with no real security, ! because it stored return addresses and did not use chaining and ! encryption. ! ! Maybe closing of anon.penet.fi will spur real interest from the unwashed ! alt.sex.* masses to the truly secure remailers. There has to be more crypto anonymizing aliasing remailers and with easier interfaces. Closing the Kleinpaste derived server will help put the pressure of demand to start better remailer systems. There's not enough capacity and reliability with the servers extant. There should be thousands of full featured remailers. We'll help out as soon as we can get the hardware problems we have figured out and provided there's understandably configurable linux networking software out there. Would it be a good idea to have a 100% open server that anyone can telnet in and copy all the e-mail data? If the chaining crypto remailers are reliable, there's no reason why not, except the risk of clock cycle cryptanalysis. There should be an easy way of preventing those attacks, if not, the data can be read accessable only after the {de|en}cryption. This openness should go a long way in protection so far as liability is concerned. In other words, if Big Brother can force his way into your privacy, why not little brother?