In message <199408120649.XAA07108@ucsd.edu> Lance Cottrell writes:
Actually, the odds are better than this, .8^5, about 0.33. You will be compromised "only" 1/3 of the time.
But if you are sending regular messages to another party, then traffic analysis will quickly show that you are communicating, because even if the boys at Langley are really dumb, you won't make send more than two or three messages without having all the cherries lining up.
You will be protected if you have encrypted your messages, but using a remailer network offers little additional protection.
I am not sure I see why you think that the "cherries" will line up.
Remember that the original assumption was that you were choosing five remailers at random, on each transmission. I argue against this strategy; I think that if you know someone is reliable you should stick with them. 80% of the remailers are compromised, so 2/3 of single messages get through OK, 45% of two message sequences, 30% of three message sequences, etc. If a population of users selects five remailers at random and sticks to their initial selection, 1/3 of the population will be compromised immediately. Langley will have to try harder to get the rest. -- Jim Dixon