Essentially what these guys are selling is a secret key algorithm in which the key for any given message is a function of some initial seed value, and of hashes of all previous messages transmitted between the two parties. So in theory, to break the code, one would need to know not only their initial key, but also all of the messages trasmitted between them so far. A similar result can be achieved by encrypting with PCBC, or other feedback mode involving plaintext, and carrying the IV from the end of one session to the beginning of the next. This is not, of course, a one-time pad, and hardly "groundbreaking" or "revolutionary". While such a system could be designed securely in theory, the folks at Elementrix appear to have little experience at designing secure cryptographic systems. Cryptographic systems designed by such novices frequently have bugs in the implementation which weaken the security offered, or have statistical weaknesses which allow cryptanalytic attack. Elementrix has offered no assurances that they have tested their system for either. Beware of snake oil.