Modemac writes:
The basic idea for this system goes like this:
1) A person writes a message and encrypts it with PGP. 2) That person then posts his message to the "anonymous messages" newsgroup. 3) A remailer scanning the newsgroup picks up the message, decrypts it, strips the headers and makes it anonymous, and sends it to its destination.
Just for the record, I'll note this is a fairly old idea (cf. the Cyphernomicon, news:alt.anonymous, news:alt.anonymous.messages, etc.) [...]
A "token" (like the token ring of IBM fame) would be passed back and forth between all of the Cryptoclients in the remailer network, so that only one remailer would be "active" at any given time. This token would be passed back and forth at random, so no one would know exactly which remailer is being used to anonymize a message.
I don't see how this is possible given widespread RFC 822 compliance. Any given message must be sent from some particular address. I see two main options: (1) The remailed-message is sent as a single message from a single remailer. That remailer is subject to various sorts of pressure if the remailed- message offends its recipient. (2) The remailed-message is sent as several messages from several remailers. The recipient's MDA reassembles the fragments into the remailed-message. Any or all of those remailers are subject to pressure if the remailed- message offends the recipient. Either way, at least one remailer is subject to pressure for sending a specific piece of email. (If the token is passed around randomly, then it might be more difficult for an adversary to predict which remailer will send the _next_ message. However, adversaries such as Cof$ are interested in assailing remailers that have _already_ sent messages, due to the content of those messages. They can tell which remailer sent _past_ messages, which is what they need.) -Futplex <futplex@pseudonym.com>