-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Lucky Green <shamrock@netcom.com> wrote:
This is unnecessary, since there is no "true" ecash. DigiCash's ecash in its current form, the only version David Chaum is willing to licenese, is fully traceable. Popular Cypherpunk's myths nonwithstanding.
First, the recipient of funds is non-anonymous by design. Second, any payer can trivialy make the recipient of a ecash note known by revealing the blinding factor. For purposed of lawenforcement, DigiCash's ecash in no more secure than if the (insert horseman here) billed his fees to a credit card.
I'm sorry-- what do you mean by "the recipient of funds is non-anonymous"? I cannot envision any centralized currency system in which a user's funds were *not* known to the bank! Secondly, there is a tremendous difference between a person being able to identify you as the recipient of their money (which they can pretty much do anyway, with less surety, just by saying "That's him! He's the one I gave it to!") and a third party such as the bank or a government being able to monitor all your transactions. For such an organization to perform that feat on a DigiCash user they would need the cooperation of all of the people with whom he exchanges currency, and if they have that, then cryptography seems irrelevant. :-) I hope I'm not missing anything here. Regards, Bryce signatures follow: + public key on keyservers /. island Life in a chaos sea or via finger 0x617c6db9 / bryce.wilcox@colorado.edu ---* -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Auto-signed with Bryce's Auto-PGP v1.0beta3 iQCVAwUBMEz5/vWZSllhfG25AQEVsAQAo27grJhSgGV6iO2vIMILiBiib33/Z/73 Fzj5jgGVgqnlJ73UjHrInSas0p7wdKUf+PeLEtSc4xkMnOPvr3gsT34YAOvO6rcR DsKwE7mnxK6hmxZl2UkUJ/dhZql5wbT2im27/RC+N2wgaGbahedpJfdjj+QPP06h uEPTjvT7Yco= =hDCy -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----