Cypherpatriots, It's becoming more and more evident that the Crypto War has already started, that the fascists in power have decided to ban the keeping of secrets and the use of strong crypto by nongovernment folks. In later messages I will expand on the ways we can actively sabotage the Clipper/Skipjack/Capstone/MYK-xx/Tessera key escrow systems, sabotage them with reverse engineering, with the planting of compromised versions on store shelves, with the publication of technical specs (such as "someone" did with the dumpster-diving adventure at Mykotronx--which I've heard freaked out the national security establishment!), and with the active spreading of disinformation about the compromise of the key escrow system. (Not everyone will like this "call to arms." I expect some harsh responses. But isn't this what we cherish about free speech, the ability to talk about controversial matters, even something as controversial (well, not to me, of course) as advocating the overthrow of the U.S. government?) How could Clipper be sabotaged? As a hint of what to expect, imagine the reaction of potential Clipper users to the reports that BlackNet has already seen the offer of $200,000 for the family keys? Or for the information leaking out of VLSI Technology Inc., fabricators of the Mykotronx chip (and the ARM 6 that is part of the key escrow system), that different "family keys" are being produced for different _countries_ (UK, Japan, etc.). I'm sure these countries will be thrilled to welcome these chips onto their shores, knowing that the family keys have already been provided to the National Security Agency! (Sidebar on U.S. surveillance of Japan: Japan's version of the NSA, the little talked about Chobetsu, is already advising Japanese chip makers that the NSA listening sites at Misawa Air Force Base is heavily targeting economic intelligence. "Yomiuri Shimbun," a large daily newspaper, reported on 2-29-92 that the NSA and other U.S. intelligence agencies had stepped up spying activities on Japanese manufacturing companies, intercepting faxes, voicemail, and ordinary conversations. Ostensibly, I suppose, this interception is targeted at detecting evidence of collusion by the keiretsus, arms agreement violations (recall the Toshiba propeller-machining case), and shipments of sensitive technology to U.S. adversaries. However, my contacts in the U.S. chip industry say the intercepted material is being used in pricing decisions and in trade negotiation talks, as with the "20% of your chip purchases must be of U.S. chips, or else....," and that the Japanese have just in the last 2 years launched a major effort to secure their faxes, voice lines, and computer networks against interception by the NSA and their affiliated eavesdropping compadres (Naval Security Group, Air Force Electronic Security Command, and Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM), all of which operate out of large military bases maintained in Japan, but whose antennas are increasing turned away from Sakhalin Island and toward the commercial traffic flowing in our major economic opponent. These are the potential--but not very likely!--customers of Clipjack.) Methinks the "classifed aspects" of Clipper/Skipjack that Dorothy Denning recently mentioned (Denning: there are things the goverment needs to do that it can't tell you about) have largely to do with this economic espionage. Which is why we're already seeing "family keys" generated for specific target countries, like Japan, Germany, and France (our major "enemies" in this new world without our former enemies). Part of our sabotage of key escrow can be the recruiting of more Cypherpunks in these targeted countries and the providing of them with material we find from anonymous sources who forward juicy material (like the Mykotronx contracts, dates, specs, etc.). We can help create an attitude of intense skepticism about key escrow, perhaps even resulting in the widespread repudiation of Clipper use by corporations in these countries. (For example, how would Toshiba react to the report that Intel's Flash Memory group was tipped off about the planned production volumes for Toshiba's 16 Mbit flash? Do you think Toshiba will be an eager customer for Clipjacked phones from the U.S.? Right.) And key escrow can of course be attacked on "general principles." The idea that some conversations must be "escrowed" (whether the _keys_ are escrowed or the entire conversation is escrowed for later opening is a distinction without a difference) is anathema to everything this country once stood for. (Key escrow is analogous of course to requiring all Citizen Units of these Beknighted States to "escrow" their personal letters, diaries, family album pictures, and kitchen recipes with the local constables. After all, what if the government "needs" to consult these escrowed files to see if illegal kiddie porn pictures of one's infants are being pasted into the photo album, or if seditious thoughts are being discussed in letters, or if "hateful speech" is being used? As Professor Denning has pointed out, escrowing of the contents of one's house does not affect the law-abiding citizen, who has nothing to fear if he has nothing to hide, and allows law enforcement officers the needed means of ensuring full compliance with all 17,532 laws now on the books. Besides, the key escrow systems ensures that safeguards exist: both the FBI and the Department of Justice will have to agree before your escrowed diaries, letters, photo albums, and recipes can be examined. You, of course, will not be notified that this has happened.) Clipper and Capstone (the data standard that is coming), known also by various names such as Skipjack, MYK-xx, Tessera, etc., are said to be "voluntary" standards, but the signs are pointing toward the outlawing--officially or practically (more on what I mean by this below)--of alternatives to these Big Brotherish systems: * Clipper/Capstone/Tessera will be useless in "fighting crime" if the targets refuse to use them. Even a "dumb criminal" is not going to pay extra money for an official AT&T "Clipjack" phone....he'll either take no special precautions whatsoever (a la John Gotti) or his technicians will set him up with something other than the key escrow system. * The inevitable "market failure" of Clipperphones ("Reach out and tap someone") will result in calls for a mandatory standard. We've all seen this coming ever since the first proposal (and earlier, as I wrote in my October 1992 piece, "A Trial Balloon to Ban Encryption?") * The "Digital Data Superhighway" (what a dumb name!) will almmost certainly attempt to impose various kinds of regulations and rules for data. You all can speculate on the laws... * The tax avoidance implications of strong crypto are so profound that the Feds are undoubtedly panicking about this. (A source tells me that my "crypto anarchy" schemes, now being talked about by others, and the subject of articles in various magazines, are being taken seriously be the Treasury folks and FinCEN, and that they are getting more and more active in the NSA-NIST-CIA-Justice planning for key escrow, wiretapping, and surveillance. (Cf. the great article in "Wired," the December issue (I think--it has Sonic the Hedgehog on the cover), on FinCEN, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network.) * Speaking of wiretapping, the S.266-based wiretap proposal *has not gone away*. It will come back bigger and badder than ever. I'm attaching the description of what's cooking now, based on an article from yesterday's NYT. Key escrow, wiretapping, increased surveillance of economic transactions, FinCEN, the collusion of the credit reporting agencies with intelligence folks (how do you think 50,000 people in the Witness Security Program (aka Witness Protection Program) are so well hidden in this age of computers?), all are changing the equation drastically. There are more than 700 subscribers to the Cypherpunks list. If only a handful of us actively sabotage the Clipper/Skipjack system, we may have a major impact. (Of course, our putting the "penny on the track" could also produce the train wreck of a complete crackdown on computer communications, but this is unlikely: the genie's already out of the bottle, the networks are already too anarchic and too ubiquitous, the sites are already beyond the control of the U.S. government. Time to sabotage this whole Big Brother system. --Tim May And here's the article, or a summary of it, about the Administration's ongoing plans to put a goverment wiretap in every network: From: Junger@samsara.law.cwru.edu (Peter D. Junger) Newsgroups: talk.politics.crypto Subject: White House Seeking Software to Aid in Wiretaps Date: Sat, 12 Feb 1994 14:09:20 GMT Lines: 27 Message-ID: <Junger.274.761062160@samsara.law.cwru.edu> The New York Times has an article this morning (9/12/94) on the first page of the national edition by Edmund L. Andrews, datelined Washington, Feb. 11 with the headline that appears above in the subject line. I quote two paragraphs: "The White House is pressing for legislation to force telephone and cable companies to install computer software on their networks that would enable law enforcement agencies to eavesdrop on phone calls and computer transmissions, Clinton Administration officials said today. ". . . . "Like the computer chip plan, the new bill is likely to put the Administration on a collision course with both telecommunication companies and civil rights groups. Industry executives believe any such measure could cost as much as $300 million, so that they would have to seek higher rates from customers. Civil rights groups argue the measure is largely unnecessary and poses potential threats to privacy." The bill is supposedly a new version of the wiretapping bill that Bush asked for and did not get. Peter D. Junger Case Western Reserve University Law School, Cleveland, OH Internet: JUNGER@SAMSARA.LAW.CWRU.Edu -- Bitnet: JUNGER@CWRU