Hal writes:
"Perry E. Metzger" <perry@piermont.com> writes:
Hal writes:
The point is that if the anonymity afforded by ecash is too costly in terms of time, then we may end up stuck with a non-anonymous system simply because that is the only one efficient enough to work. It would be good to find out if that is a serious problem.
I suspect that as CPU speed exponentiates this will become less and less of a problem. It doesn't especially worry me.
Consider, though, what happens in the current ecash system if it were used to charge a penny per page. [Describes lots of steps...]
I'm really not that convinced that this is a problem in either direction. With users everywhere on the net connected via multi-megabit per second links, high speed CPUs, etc, a few extra TCP connections and RSA operations really might not be noticed in a half dozen years.
This all has to happen whenever you click on a link in your browser. Even with fast CPU's I think the extra step of connecting to the bank, having it check against all coins, and getting approval will be considerable for each link traversal.
Again, I'm not convinced either way. I believe we have to wait and see how fast things really are in practice. Perry