Provisional Internet Draft Reputation Servers 1. Status of this document: This document has not been submitted to any formal groups and is merely a draft for a future official draft. All comments concerning this draft should be sent to rclark@nyx.cs.du.edu (Robert Clark). 2. Background: Many eminent persons have discussed the need for a more methodological process of screening mailing lists and newsgroups through reputation markets. This document attempts to move toward the accomplishment of that goal, by defining it. For a reputation server to have any true worth, it must be a market. To avoid the 'rigging' of the market by means of false purchasing and sale of reputation by numerous pseudonymous entities, all messages to the server must be signed with PGP keys themselves, and those which are questionable shall be themselves counted. Those who choose not to sign their messages will be limited to the informational aspects of the server. A desirable but not strictly necessary aspect of a reputation server would be the ability to rate the initial 'buying power' of any particular key according to degrees of trustworthiness. 3. Recent Developments [This section is empty; if anyone knows of any repserver software which preexists this draft, please alert the author.] 4. Summary of Reputation Server: The author intends within 180 days of the writing of this draft to implement at least a rudimentary reputation server with the following functions: a) Accepts only encrypted and signed 'sales' [*] and 'purchases', with either PGP or other public-key software. b) Gives 'buying' power directly according to the amount of 'reputation stock' bought by others. c) Can mark certain users as being sufficiently lacking in 'reputation capital' to effect 'public opinion.' * d) Can filter a mailing list, public or private. [* indicates features which would be desirable but are not necessary.] The use of a single-quote indicates that the term used is used in an abstract way, and not as it is used in conversation. 'Public opinion' is a gestalt of the 'sales' and 'purchases' made by the participants in the market. Others can use the market for informational purposes, but will not affect the 'market value' of certain personalities. 5. Basis of the Market Each 'personality' which registers with the reputation market, by sending a PGP-signed and encrypted message, using the public key of the server, starts with a fixed sum of 'money' and a fixed price for their 'reputation stock.' Using one's initial allotment of funds, one can choose not to use it, accruing interest (which can be negative or positive, depending on whether the average 'value' of all 'personalities' is decreasing or increasing. Otherwise, one can invest the 'cash' in the reputation of others, deciding at that time how much that 'stock' is worth. The method of implementation allows an early poster with no 'reputation capital' to make a small change in the 'public opinion,' whereas a user with great 'reputation capital' has great influence on the stocks of others. A user of the system can choose to set the asking price of their 'stock' at any value, or can sell only a part of it, or not sell it at all. However, having stock and not transferring it to 'reputation capital,' while safe, is not very 'profitable.' As an example: User X, a new user, begins with a reputation value of 1000. He immediately invests 990 units of 'value' in one 'share' of User Y, with a reputation value of 5000. As Y has sold 99 'shares' for an average of 990, and has set 990 as a minimum asking price for his stock, the 'value' of an individual 'share' of Y 'stock' has remained identical. The result of this is that the 'reputation capital' of Y has increased by 990, Y's shares available to sell are 0. Y is, of course, free to purchase back her own stock; or free to purchase some of X's. [This is an incomplete definition of the market, which is to be improved in later versions of the draft. Those with better suggestions as to the implementation of the market, with less reliance upon the user to figure out 'proper' asking prices for 'shares' of 'reputation stock,' are welcomed to mail the author.] 6. Overview and Summation: A reputation market could server a valuable function, and prove to be another example of how secure crypto can be not only fashionable but functional as well. Not just drug dealers and terrorists need strong crypto, just as not just criminals need the Bill of Rights. The fact that both systems aid members of both groups simply indicates that strong crypto is good for _everyone_. Thank you. ---- rclark@nyx.cs.du.edu 6. Summation