Someone posted a way to resist altered bank notes [...] by something called (if I remember right) a "cut-and-choose" protocol.
Karl Barrus posted this, and I've been meaning to respond to it. Basically, Karl's scheme doesn't work. With any cut-and-choose protocol, there must be some assurance that the two things offered are the same thing, and, in a series of them, that all the things offered are the same thing. With a blind signature, the signature itself is that which has value, not the thing signed.
To make things very simple for a bank, I suggest having fixed value digital pseudonyms for each value of bank note. For example, the Bank of Hastings on Kent would use "AU 500 mg from HoK Bank" as the user name for all signed 500 milligram gold certificates.
Basically yes. More accurately, the bank has one key for each denomination for each particular time range. The key is the significant entity here, not the user name. The blind signer could make a regular signature attaching a name to that key, of course. Eric