Aside from the privacy principle arguments, there is the very same logistics problem, securely keeping hundreds of millions of keys, fully up to date (many people and operations change keys every day or week) sufficiently secure as to be tamper-ptoof yet sufficently accessible to retrieve in 2-3 hrs as required by LEAs. They can't even keep much smaller amounts of INS info without major screw-ups. Interestingly, there is a special federal court which authorizes wire taps on foreign 'national security' targets. No request has ever been turned down. The only way to keep keys secure in the long run is to let the owners be responsible for their own security. ****************************************************** Jay Holovacs holovacs@idt.net PGP Annoy Big Brother -- use PGP ". . . one of the most difficult problems confronting law enforcement as the next century approaches" FBI Director Freeh ****************** ==========================
From: Declan McCullagh <declan@well.com> >From: Joe Shea <joeshea@netcom.com> To: Declan McCullagh <declan@well.com> Cc: fight-censorship-announce@vorlon.mit.edu Subject: Re: FC: Brookings Inst. on crypto: "There are reasonable compromises"
Declan, what would you think if the actual keepers of the keys, so to speak, were the courts, such as the Administratoive Office of the US Courts? That would at least seem to reduce a lot of the possible privacy concerns. One has the sense that once they get into the hands of the varius agencies, they'll get back out.