A) Maintanence requests come in through the remailer network. Someone tcp sniffing my incoming network would only see SMPT packets coming froma remailer.) and the SMTP messages would be encrypted with alpha.c2.org's key. B) See (A) C) We don't keep any information about the owners of anonymous accounts. We will gladly give up any information we have given a properly executed court order. The important fact though is that we don't have the information that an LEA would need to find the person publishing the materials that the LEA doesn't like. The anon shell accounts are more difficult to secure.
alpha.c2.org will soon start provided anonymous web page services. You can get normal webserver access (the alpha.c2.org web pages will be very limited) through an anonymous shell account.
A more cypherpunky type of application would be to enable anonymous httpd's so that your clients could advertise their nice/naughty products and be safe from location identification. If they had to pack up then they could move to another ISP and reconnect to the anon.net as normal. (Didnt I just read this in a spam HOWTO?)
The problem I see is when a LEA gets involved and snoops your wires and traces you back to your starting point and then traces the client that is supplying nasty httpd services. You wouldnt necessarily be aware of this occuring either.
How do you propose to protect entities wanting to utilise this function from
a) people sniffing the tcp packets coming in to discover who is maintaining a web page,
b) the above LEA attack where your own lines are monitored and data is tracked back thru the various networks to the web page maintainer?
c) an open LEA confrontation where they issue a warrant demanding any and all info you have on the web page maintainer. (e.g. co$ doesnt like whats on one of the pages)
The same again for the anon shell accounts.
Apart from a once off mailed to you via remailer, the creator of a web page needs to maintain their creations. This implies a means of accessing it that is repeatable. Wether thats via a dialup account or over the net, it can be traced. It's only when the entity uses channels outside of the jurisdiction or capabilities of those monitoring that some anonymity can be achieved. (Implies they weren't monitored entering the blinding channels in the first place).
Cheers, Mark mark@lochard.com.au
-- sameer Voice: 510-601-9777 Community ConneXion FAX: 510-601-9734 The Internet Privacy Provider Dialin: 510-658-6376 http://www.c2.org (or login as "guest") sameer@c2.org