Date: Thu, 21 Jul 1994 14:54:22 -0400 From: Jonathan Rochkind <jrochkin@cs.oberlin.edu> Subject: Clipper Chip Retreat
It's still a bad idea, but a public-domain algorithm clipper with non-governmental escrow agents isn't quite as obvously insane and inane as the previous clipper.
Sorry, but the major Clipper flaw to me (and at least one corporate executive with whom I've discussed this) *is* the very idea of key escrow. My previous company used to sell computers to banks and funds transfer agents. A skeleton key to the crypto they used would be worth enough money to warrant an expensive attack -- and the vulnerable place to attack is the escrow databases. Of course they could fix this vulnerability. They could use the NSA HQ and maybe Fort Knox as the escrow sites. That would make us all more comfortable with the scheme, wouldn't it? - Carl